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Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard  
for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages  
Christopher B. Seaman* 
ABSTRACT 
Determining damages for infringement is one of the most 
important—and controversial—issues in patent litigation. The current 
fifteen-factor Georgia-Pacific standard for determining a reasonable 
royalty has become increasingly difficult for juries to apply in patent 
disputes involving complex, high-technology products, resulting in 
unpredictable damage awards that tend to overcompensate patentees.  
This Article proposes a more manageable alternative to Georgia-
Pacific when an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patented 
technology exists. Specifically, in a hypothetical bargain for a patent 
license, both economic and negotiation theory explain that a rational 
patent licensor would agree to pay only the costs it would incur to adopt 
and implement a noninfringing substitute technology, plus any lost 
benefits related to the substitute’s use. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
already has recognized an analogous limitation on damages in the 
context of lost profits, although it has defined the universe of 
alternatives too narrowly by refusing to consider imperfect substitutes 
for the patented technology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Determining damages for infringement is one of the most 
important—and controversial—issues in current patent litigation.1 
Jury verdicts of over $100 million have become almost 
commonplace in the past few years:2  
 In February 2007, Lucent was awarded $1.53 billion against 
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two 
patents used in the MP3 audio compression format;3 
 In February 2008, Dr. Bruce Saffran was awarded $501 
million against Boston Scientific as a reasonable royalty for 
infringement of a patent covering drug-eluting stent 
technology;4 
 
 1. See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE § 
7.3.4.7 (2009) (“One of the most vexing issues in patent law today relates to the proper 
measure of damages.”); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to 
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (“The 
calculation of patent damages has become one of the most contentious issues in all of 
intellectual property (IP) law.”); Michael H. King & Steven M. Evans, Selecting an 
Appropriate Damages Expert in a Patent Case: An Examination of the Current Status of 
Daubert, 38 AKRON L. REV. 357, 357 (2005) (“The determination of damages is a critical part 
of any patent case.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Patent 
Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives 
Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 827 (2007) (“Jury awards [for 
patent infringement] exceeding $100 million were relatively rare before 1990 but now are 
common.”). 
  Notably, this list does not include cases settled in the face of potential damage 
awards of similar magnitude. See, e.g., Press Release, Broadcom.com, Qualcomm and 
Broadcom Reach Settlement and Patent Agreement (Apr. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.broadcom.com/ press/release.php?id=s379764 (settlement of $891 million for 
patent litigation regarding cellular chips); Press Release, Research in Motion, Ltd., Research in 
Motion and NTP Sign Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006), 
available at http://press.rim.com/release.jsp?id=981 (settlement for $612.5 million regarding 
wireless email patents in the face of a permanent injunction). 
 3. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d 
on other grounds, 543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008). After trial, the district court granted 
Microsoft’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or motion for a new trial regarding 
damages on several grounds, including misapplication of the so-called “entire market value 
rule.” Id. at 935–40. 
 4. Final Judgment, Saffran v. Boston Sci., Corp., No. 2:05-CV-547 (TJW) (E.D. Tex. 
Feb. 2, 2008), motion for new trial on damages denied, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52561 (E.D. 
Tex. July 9, 2008). 
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 In April 2008, Lucent was awarded another $358 million 
against Microsoft—raised to $511 million after prejudgment 
interest—as a reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent 
on a date-picking feature utilized by Microsoft Outlook;5 
 In June 2008, Cornell University was awarded $184 million 
against Hewlett-Packard as a reasonable royalty for 
infringement of a patent regarding computer instruction-
processing techniques;6  
 In April 2009, Uniloc was awarded $388 million against 
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent 
about technology designed to deter software piracy;7 
 In May 2009, i4i Limited Partnership was awarded $200 
million against Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for 
infringement of a patent regarding custom XML encoding in 
Microsoft Word,8 a feature that was “used by only a small 
fraction of Microsoft’s customers”;9  
 In June 2009, Centocor, a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, 
was awarded $1.67 billion—including $504 million as a 
reasonable royalty—against Abbott Laboratories for 
infringement of a patent on a drug for autoimmune 
diseases;10  
 In August 2009, Versata Software was awarded $138 million 
against SAP as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two 
 
 5. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2008), 
vacated and remanded, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 6. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
After trial, the district court reduced the judgment amount to approximately $53 million. Id. 
at 291–92. 
 7. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, and remanded, No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). 
This award was vacated by the district court in September 2009 when it granted judgment as a 
matter of law of noninfringement for Microsoft. Id. at 154, 161–76. 
 8. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 
598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 
10-290).  
 9. i4i, 598 F.3d at 862. 
 10. Verdict Form, Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 07-CV-139-TWJ 
(E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009), available at http://thepriorart.typepad.com/files/ 
centocor.abbott.verdict.form.pdf. The remaining $1.168 billion was awarded as lost profits. Id. 
This is the largest verdict in the history of U.S. patent litigation. The Plaintiff’s Hot List, NAT’L 
L.J., Oct. 5, 2009, at S8. 
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patents on methods for pricing products in multilevel 
product and organization groups;11  
 In March 2010, VirnetX was awarded $105 million against 
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two 
patents related to virtual private networks (“VPN”) between 
computers;12 and 
 In October 2010, Mirror Worlds was awarded a total of 
$625.5 million as a reasonable royalty against Apple for 
infringement of three patents—$208.5 million per patent—
by Apple’s computers and mobile devices.13 
In addition, methods for calculating damages have become a 
primary stumbling block for patent reform legislation, which has 
languished in Congress since 2005.14  
This Article argues that the current “gold standard” for awarding 
reasonable royalty damages15—the so-called Georgia-Pacific16 test—
has become increasingly difficult for juries to apply in lengthy and 
complex patent trials, resulting in unpredictable damage awards.17 
 
 11. Verdict Form, Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., No. 2:07-CV-153 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 26, 2009). 
 12. Verdict Form, VirnetX Holding Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07-CV-80 (E.D. 
Tex. Mar. 16, 2010). This litigation was subsequently settled for $200 million in May 2010. 
Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft and VirnetX Settle Patent Infringement Cases (May 
17, 2010), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/may10/05-
17newspr.mspx. 
 13. Verdict Form, Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-88 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 
1, 2010). 
 14. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628; see also Damages Provisions of the Patent 
Reform Act, LAW360, May 28, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/99166 (explaining 
that “[p]erhaps no effort has been more contentious than that directed toward changing the 
damages provision of the patent statute”); George Best, Benjamin Berkowitz & Stephen 
Maebius, How Damaged Is the Patent Reform Act? Dispute Over How to Calculate Awards Is 
Just the Latest IP Debate Slowing Down This Bill, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2008, at 16, available 
at 2008 WLNR 27111257 (noting that the Patent Reform Act “is being held up, in large part, 
by a dispute over proposed changes to the statute governing damage awards for patent 
infringement”). 
 15. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628. 
 16. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970).  
 17. See F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier: 
Identifying Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 48, 83–84 
(2009) (arguing that “[t]he myriad of possibilities for parties to . . . cherry-pick [from Georgia-
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The Georgia-Pacific test, developed almost forty years ago by a 
district court and subsequently adopted by the Federal Circuit,18 
identifies fifteen factors for the jury to consider in a so-called 
“hypothetical negotiation” between the patentee and the accused 
infringer.19 These factors involve a wide variety of technical, financial, 
licensing, and other issues. Furthermore, they are nonexclusive, 
meaning that the jury may consider any relevant information that 
does not fall within a particular factor.20 Finally, courts have refused 
to mandate any method for weighing these factors, thus permitting 
the parties, their damages experts, and the jury to pick and choose 
which factors they consider more or less important in any given 
case.21 As a result, it is unsurprising that Georgia-Pacific has been 
criticized as giving juries “little useful guidance”22 in determining a 
reasonable royalty.  
Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that Georgia-Pacific 
has resulted in the systematic overcompensation of patent owners in 
certain industries.23 Moreover, the wide latitude given to juries in 
evaluating the Georgia-Pacific factors makes it difficult for courts to 
review reasonable royalty awards to determine if they are supported 
 
Pacific’s] constellation of fifteen separate factors probably doomed the reproducibility of 
outcomes from the outset”). 
 18. See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (stating that “[a] comprehensive list of relevant factors in determining a reasonable 
royalty is set out in Georgia-Pacific”); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 
1077 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming reasonable royalty award based on trial court’s application of 
Georgia-Pacific). 
 19. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 20. See, e.g., Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (stating that factors considered in the reasonable royalty analysis “include those set out 
in Georgia-Pacific”). 
 21. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–21 (“[T]here is no formula by which 
these [fifteen] factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by 
which their economic significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary 
equivalent.”). 
 22. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11–12 (2008). 
 23. Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 655, 667 (2009); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 26 (2008) (finding that 
“current litigation practices often produce a royalty award substantially in excess of a 
reasonable royalty”). 
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by substantial evidence.24 This is particularly problematic because a 
reasonable royalty recently has become the most commonly 
employed method for calculating patent infringement damages, 
supplementing or replacing the traditional remedy of the patentee’s 
lost profits.25 
This Article offers an alternative standard for calculating a 
reasonable royalty when there is an acceptable substitute to the 
patented technology. Specifically, it proposes that a reasonable 
royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused 
infringer’s expected costs of adopting an acceptable noninfringing 
substitute. This standard is based on the economic principle of 
substitutability: a rational actor will not pay more for a particular 
good or service when a lower-cost replacement is available. This 
standard is also supported by negotiation theory, which explains that 
a rational negotiator would not agree to an outcome that would be 
worse than the next-best available alternative if no deal was reached. 
As a result, when an acceptable substitute to the patented technology 
exists, a rational accused infringer would pay only the amount that it 
would cost to obtain (or internally develop) and implement the 
substitute technology, as well as any lost profits or other costs 
incurred due to the substitute’s adoption. In fact, the Federal Circuit 
has already recognized an analogous limitation on damages in the 
context of lost profits.26  
Part II of this Article discusses the history of a reasonable royalty 
prior to Georgia-Pacific, including early cases’ consideration of 
acceptable noninfringing substitutes. Part III explains the current 
regime for calculating patent damages, including the relative decline 
of lost profits as a basis for recovery compared to a reasonable royalty 
under the Georgia-Pacific standard. Part IV explains why Georgia-
Pacific’s application in modern patent trials is problematic, 
 
 24. See also Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632–35 (finding that overwhelming 
majority of courts affirm the reasonable royalty number selected by the jury). 
 25. See ARON LEVKO, 2009 PATENT DAMAGES STUDY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, slide 9 
(Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/ 
docs/alevko.pdf (finding that since 1999, 54% of damages awards were calculated based on a 
reasonable royalty, compared to 40% based on lost profits). 
 26. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that to recover lost profits, a patentee must establish, inter alia, 
“absence of an acceptable, non-infringing substitute for the patented product” (citing Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978))). 
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particularly those involving complex, high-technology products that 
may practice numerous patents. Finally, Part V contends that the 
cost of adopting an acceptable noninfringing substitute should serve 
as a ceiling on a reasonable royalty award. Part V also addresses 
potential concerns that such a ceiling would result in the 
undercompensation of patentees by granting a “free option” to 
infringe. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR  
PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
A. Recognizing Reasonable Royalties as a Measure of Damages 
Before 1915, courts generally rejected the idea of a reasonable 
royalty for patent infringement.27 Instead, the “chief measure” of a 
patentee’s damages was “an established royalty rate from actual 
licenses” for the patent-in-suit.28 For example, in Rude v. Westcott,29 
the Supreme Court held that damages for infringement did not 
include a reasonable royalty for the patented technology.30 In that 
case, the plaintiffs—assignees of the original patentee31—sought 
royalties for the two patents-in-suit, which claimed an improved drill 
for seeding machines.32 The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim for an 
 
 27. JOHN M. SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER S. MARCHESE & JOHN LAND, PATENT 
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:9 (2009). 
 28. Id.; see also Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (“It is a general rule in 
patent causes that established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be used.”); 
Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1952) (“Where an established royalty for a 
license is proved, this is the best measure of the value of what was taken by the 
infringement.”). 
 29. 130 U.S. 152 (1889). 
 30. Id. at 166–67. 
 31. Id. at 162–63.  
 32. Id. at 163–64. The plaintiffs-assignees “waived all claim for [lost] profits arising 
from the manufacture, use and sale of the patented machines” because “no machines” 
embodying the patented technology “had been manufactured and put on the market by the 
patentee[] or . . . his assignees.” Id. at 163, 167.  
  Interestingly, the assignment in Rude provided that the patentee granted the 
plaintiffs-assignees the right to “demand, sue for and receive” licensing fees against “all and 
any person whomsoever, who may have been, or may be, manufacturing or selling said drills 
containing the [patented] improvements.” Id. at 156. The patentee would receive 25% of the 
“sales, royalties, or settlements” obtained by the plaintiffs, after deducting litigation and 
licensing costs. Id. at 157–58. Thus, the plaintiffs in Rude appear to be an early type of non-
practicing entity—also called a “patent troll”—that “purchased or licensed the patents at issue 
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established royalty, finding that the two licenses identified did not 
“establish a market price” for the patented technology.33 In addition, 
it concluded that the plaintiffs could not recover a “reasonable and 
fair royalty” for the alleged infringement.34 During a proceeding 
before a special master on damages, plaintiffs offered testimony from 
several witnesses “to estimate the value” of the patents.35 
Defendants, in turn, argued that no royalty should be awarded 
because there were acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the 
patented technology.36 Ultimately, the Court rejected the claim for a 
reasonable royalty, holding that plaintiffs’ “conjectural estimates” of 
the patents’ value did not offer a legally cognizable basis for 
damages.37 
In 1915, however, the Supreme Court sanctioned a “reasonable 
royalty” as an appropriate measure of patent infringement damages. 
In Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co.,38 
which involved litigation over a patent for an improved grain drill, 
the plaintiff was unable to prove any lost profits due to defendants’ 
infringement.39 In addition, the Court held “there was no 
established royalty” because the plaintiff had maintained the patent 
 
from another . . . solely for the purpose of licensing [the] patented technology.” RICHARD F. 
CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO ECONOMIC 
MODELS AND OTHER DAMAGE STRATEGIES 20 (2009); see also John R. Allison, Mark A. 
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (describing “nonpracticing entities” as 
including “licensing companies in the business of buying up and enforcing patents (‘trolls’ by 
virtually anyone’s definition)”). 
 33. Rude, 130 U.S. at 163–65 (“Sales of licenses, made at periods years apart, will not 
establish any rule on the subject and determine the value of the patent.”).  
 34. Id. at 166. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. (offering testimony from defense witnesses—who had examined and used 
drills embodying the patented technology—“that they did not consider [the patented drills] of 
any more utility than other seeding drills in use, and that [the patented drills] did not bring 
any greater price in the market”). 
 37. Id. at 167 (holding that the special master’s reasonable royalty violated “a settled 
rule of law . . . that actual, not speculative, damages must be shown, and by clear and definite 
proof, to warrant a recovery for the infringement of a patent”). 
 38. 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915). 
 39. Id. 
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as a “close monopoly” by refusing to license it.40 Nevertheless, the 
Court held that in such situations, the plaintiff could “show the 
value by proving what would have been a reasonable royalty” for the 
patent.41 It explained that 
[i]f there had been an established royalty, the jury could have 
taken that sum as the measure of damages. In the absence of 
such royalty, and in the absence of proof of lost sales or 
injury by competition, the only measure of damages was such 
sum as, under all the circumstances, would have been a 
reasonable royalty for the defendant to have paid.42 
The Dowagiac court concluded that a reasonable royalty should 
be determined in light of “the nature of the invention, its utility and 
advantages, and the extent of the use involved.”43 As John Schlicher 
has explained, this meant a reasonable royalty “should be based on 
the utility and advantages this invention provided beyond those 
available from use of the next best alternative.”44 Consequently, 
“[t]he Court was requiring that the royalty measure be set based on 
the marginal value of the invention” over any substitutes.45 
In 1922, Congress amended the patent laws46 to codify the 
Dowagiac decision and authorize the recovery of a reasonable royalty 
for patent infringement.47 If a patentee suffered damages that were 
“not susceptible of calculation and determination with reasonable 
certainty,” such as lost profits or an established royalty, the 1922 Act 
 
 40. Id. (holding that if plaintiff had “grant[ed] licenses to others to deal in articles 
embodying the invention, the established royalty could have been proved as indicative of the 
value of what was taken, and therefore as affording a basis for measuring the damages”). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 649 (quoting Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th 
Cir. 1894)); see also U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1914) (holding 
that in “instances where no market value [for the patent] existed and where no loss or 
impairment of sales can be definitely proved,” the patentee can still recover “a ‘reasonable 
royalty’”). 
 43. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 648. 
 44. John W. Schlicher, Measuring Patent Damages by the Market Value of Inventions—
The Grain Processing, Rite-Hite, and Aro Rules, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 503, 
509 (2000). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-147, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 [hereinafter 
“1922 Act”]. 
 47. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 519–20 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“The reasonable royalty was written into the 1922 statute . . . .”). 
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allowed courts to “adjudge and decree the payment by the defendant 
to the complainant of a reasonable sum as . . . general damages for 
the infringement.”48 The 1922 Act also permitted the patentee to 
present “competent and admissible” evidence in support of a 
reasonable royalty, including expert and opinion testimony at the 
court’s discretion.49 
In 1946, the patent statute was further amended to explicitly 
declare that “a reasonable royalty” was available to determine 
damages,50 aiding a plaintiff who was unable (or unwilling) to 
establish them by other means, such as lost profits. Specifically, the 
1946 Act provided that upon a judgment of infringement, the 
patentee “shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be 
due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, not less 
than a reasonable royalty therefor, together with such costs, and 
interest, as may be fixed by the court.”51 As a result, a reasonable 
royalty became the minimum measure of damages for infringement.  
The 1952 Patent Act,52 which remains in force today, made only 
minor changes to the 1946 Act’s damages provisions. The relevant 
portion of this Act, currently embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 284, provides 
that a patentee may recover “damages adequate to compensate for 
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for 
 
 48. § 8, 42 Stat. at 392. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778 (hereinafter “1946 Act”); 
see also Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 848 (1960) 
(explaining that after the 1946 Act, “[a] reasonable royalty is now always awarded to 
compensate for the whole or any part of an infringement not compensated by other measures 
of damages” (footnotes omitted)). 
 51. 60 Stat. at 778 (emphasis added). The 1946 Act, like the 1922 Act, permitted 
expert or opinion testimony on the amount of a reasonable royalty. Id. The 1946 Act also 
removed the 1922 Act’s provision that a plaintiff should be entitled to “profits to be accounted 
for by the defendant”—i.e., disgorgement of the infringer’s own profits due to his 
misconduct—in addition to the plaintiff’s own damages. Compare § 8, 42 Stat. at 392, with 60 
Stat. at 778. The Supreme Court explained the distinction between “profits” and “damages” 
for patent infringement by stating that “[i]n patent nomenclature[,] what the infringer makes 
is ‘profits’; what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement is ‘damages.’” Duplace 
Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing 
Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1908)). The elimination of “profits” in the 1946 
Act was intended “to eliminate the recovery of [the infringer’s] profits as such and allow 
recovery of damages only.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 
505 (1964). 
 52. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–593, 66 Stat. 812.  
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the use made of the invention by the infringer.”53 The legislative 
history of the 1952 Act indicates that no substantive changes were 
intended by this alteration in language.54  
B. Noninfringing Substitutes Before Georgia-Pacific 
In calculating a reasonable royalty, several pre-Georgia-Pacific 
decisions considered the value of the patented technology in light of 
potential noninfringing substitutes. These decisions explained that 
courts must evaluate the “utility and advantages” of an invention 
over existing products or methods for accomplishing the same 
objective.55 For instance, in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Consolidated Rubber 
Tire Co.,56 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent for improved rubber 
tires, based in large part on widespread recognition that the patented 
tire had become the “standard rubber tire” and was superior to any 
available alternative.57  
Likewise, in Activated Sludge, Inc. v. Sanitary District of 
Chicago,58 the district court extensively considered the “character of 
the inventions, their utility, their history, [and] their practicability 
and advantages,” including the patent’s “usefulness and commercial 
value reflected by their advantages over other devices or processes,” 
 
 53. Id. The following sentence was added at the end of the second paragraph by Pub. L. 
No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9): “Increased damages under this paragraph shall not apply to 
provisional rights under section 154(d) of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). This 
amendment has no relevance to this Article’s analysis. 
 54. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 (1952); 98 CONG. REC. 
9097 (1952); see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 521 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“[T]he 1952 codification was not intended to make substantive 
modifications in the provisions relating to recovery . . . .”).  
 55. See, e.g., Enter. Mfg. Co. v. Shakespeare Co., 141 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1944); 
Dunkley Co. v. Cent. Cal. Canneries, 7 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1925); see also Hartford Nat’l Bank 
& Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Del. 1960) (considering the 
“nature of the invention, its utility, [and] its novelty over and advance in the art” as relevant 
factors in determining a reasonable royalty). 
 56. 251 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1918). 
 57. See id. at 623 (recounting testimony that “‘[f]ew patents have received such 
immediate and well-nigh unanimous recognition. It is the standard rubber tire of today,’” that 
the patented tire “‘has been accepted as the termination of the struggle for a completely 
successful tire,’” and that it “‘established, and has ever since maintained, its supremacy over all 
other rubber tires’”). 
 58. 64 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1946). 
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in determining a reasonable royalty.59 The patent at issue, which 
claimed an activated sludge process for treating and purifying 
sewage, was identified as the “most desirable” and “‘best adapted’ 
type of artificial sewage treatment” available, and that “no method 
has been found . . . which is as well suited to the requirements of the 
sewage treatment problem as the [patented] activated sludge 
process.”60 After an extensive analysis, the district court found that 
the available alternative identified by defendant was “inferior to that 
of activated sludge” and that the “undisputed advantages” of the 
patented process were “beyond question” and “must enter into the 
determination by this court of what is just compensation for invasion 
of plaintiffs’ rights.”61  
III. THE CURRENT DAMAGES REGIME 
 This Part explains how lost profits, once the dominant method 
for determining patent damages, has become less common than a 
reasonable royalty award based on a so-called “hypothetical 
negotiation” between the patentee and infringer for a license to the 
patented technology. Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are 
based on the fifteen-factor test adopted in the district court’s 1970 
decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.62 As 
explained below, however, the Georgia-Pacific case dramatically 
differs from modern patent infringement litigation in several 
important ways. 
A. The Relative Decline of Lost Profits 
As previously explained, under the current patent damages 
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, a patentee shall recover “damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty” for the defendants’ infringing use. Courts 
have interpreted this language to conclude that patent damages can 
be determined using several different methods.  
 
 59. Id. at 27. 
 60. Id. at 30. 
 61. Id. at 30–31; see also id. at 29–30 (describing the alternative “Imhoff trickling filter 
process”). 
 62. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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The first method is lost profits, which is a remedy for patent 
owners who can establish that the infringement deprived them of 
profits that they otherwise would have earned.63 From an economic 
perspective, “the purpose of a lost profits damages award in a patent 
case is to compensate the patent holder for the profits on sales that it 
lost as a result of the infringement.”64 The classic example of lost 
profits is diverted sales—that is, profits the patentee would have 
made from sales of goods or services but for the infringer’s wrongful 
conduct.65 Lost profits may also arise from price erosion, where 
competition by the infringer causes the patentee to reduce its prices 
and thus earn less profit on the goods or services that it did sell.66 
Other potential theories of recovery under the umbrella of lost 
profits can include increased expenditures in advertising or marketing 
to correct the harm to the patentee’s market position caused by the 
infringement;67 future lost profits due to the continuing harm caused 
by past infringement;68 and—more controversially—damages for so-
called “convoyed sales,” which are lost sales of goods that are not 
 
 63. See SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 1.7 (“The patent owner may recover its lost 
profits . . . if the patent owner can prove that the infringement caused the patent owner to lose 
profits that it otherwise would have made.”); see also BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing 
Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[A] patent owner must prove a causal 
relation between the infringement and its loss of profits.”). 
 64. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 833. 
 65. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 66. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 
SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 2.4 (“Price erosion damages are awarded when the patent 
owner establishes that its sales during the infringing period were made at prices below what 
they would have been absent infringement.”); see also Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 
536, 551 (1886) (“Reduction of prices, and consequent loss of profits, enforced by infringing 
competition, is a proper ground for awarding damages.”) (quoting Sargent v. Yale Lock Mfg. 
Co., 21 F. Cas. 507, 508 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 12,366)). 
 67. Lam, 718 F.2d at 1065; see also Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., 788 F. Supp. 
439, 444 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that “increased expenses for advertising and 
promotion” can be part of lost profits). 
 68. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Christopher 
S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747 
(1994). But see Brooktree Corp. v. Adv. Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (rejecting the patentee’s claim of future lost profits due to “the uncertainties of future 
pricing, future competition, and future markets” in the “fast-moving field” of 
semiconductors). 
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covered by the patent-in-suit, but that are typically sold in 
connection with the patented good or service.69  
The most common way to establish lost profits under § 284 is 
the four-factor test first articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc.70 “To recover lost profits 
under the Panduit test, ‘the patent owner must prove (1) a demand 
for the patented product, (2) an absence of acceptable noninfringing 
substitutes, (3) the manufacturing and marketing capability to 
exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit the patent owner 
would have made.’”71  
However, successful claims for lost profits are becoming less 
common as “courts have insisted on strict standards of proof for 
entitlement to lost profits.”72 Moreover, lost profits are unavailable 
unless the patentee directly competes with the infringer, such as by 
selling its own product that practices the patent.73 As a result, 
nonpracticing entities—which file a substantial number of 
infringement suits74—generally cannot recover damages for lost 
profits because they do not manufacture or sell their own products.75 
 
 69. See Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“A patentee may recover lost profits on unpatented components sold with a patented item, a 
convoyed sale, if both the patented and unpatented products ‘together were considered to be 
components of a single assembly or parts of a complete machine, or they together constituted a 
functional unit.’”) (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc)); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 85–93 (2001) (critically evaluating the economic basis for 
recovering lost profits damages for unpatented complementary goods). 
 70. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978); see also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545 (stating that the 
Panduit test has “since been accepted” by the Federal Circuit “as a useful, but non-exclusive, 
way for a patentee to prove entitlement to lost profits damages”). 
 71. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). 
 72. Lemley, supra note 23, at 655–56, 658 (explaining that “[c]ourts take [the 
Panduit] requirements seriously and quite often reject claims for lost profits”). 
 73. Id.; see also Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that “[b]ecause [the patentee] did not sell its invention in the United States, [it] 
could not seek damages on the basis of lost profits”). 
 74. See Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 32, at 3 (concluding that the most-
litigated patents are “disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities”); see also 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: PATENT LITIGATION 
TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 19, chart 9 (2010), 
available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2009-
patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding that nonpracticing entities brought between 10% and 46% 
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Recent empirical data demonstrate that lost profits is declining as 
a basis for recovery for patent infringement.76 In a 2009 report, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that during the 1980s and 1990s, a 
reasonable royalty was the basis for a minority of patent damages 
awards—44% and 45%, respectively—compared to 55% and 51% for 
lost profits.77 In the 2000s, however, these numbers were reversed, 
with 54% of patent damages awards calculating using a reasonable 
royalty, while only 40% were calculated as lost profits.78 
B. Reasonable Royalty and the Hypothetical Negotiation 
The Federal Circuit has held that a reasonable royalty is the 
“minimum permissible measure of damages” for patent 
infringement.79 In other words, it is “‘the floor below which 
damages shall not fall.’”80 While a reasonable royalty traditionally has 
served as a “backstop for those who cannot prove that they have lost 
profits as a result of infringement,”81 more recently some patentees 
who may have been able to prove lost profits instead have elected to 
 
of patent lawsuits from 1995 through 2008 that resulted in a judgment on the merits in the 18 
district courts with the largest number of patent suits). 
  In fact, the PriceWaterhouseCoopers study may underestimate the percentage of 
patent litigation cases filed by nonpracticing entities, since such entities often seek early 
settlements. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Lessons of the Patent Troll Tracker, 
IP L. & BUS., Jan. 31, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1202439670830 (explaining that nonpracticing entities often seek to “su[e] a 
broad swath of companies for patent infringement, then settl[e] with each defendant for less 
than the cost of fighting such a suit”). 
 75. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 74, at 11 (explaining that 
nonpracticing entities “are generally not entitled to lost profits”). 
 76. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11 (2008) (“Historically, the considerable majority of 
infringement cases were lost profits cases. However, in recent years . . . . an increasing number 
of cases require the calculation of an appropriate reasonable royalty.” (footnote omitted)). 
 77. LEVKO, supra note 25, at slide 9. These figures do not include 1% and 3% due to 
price erosion in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Id. 
 78. Id. These figures do not include 6% due to price erosion. Id. 
 79. Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 80. Lucent Techs., Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also 
Lemley, supra note 23, at 655 (describing a reasonable royalty as a “fallback remedy”). 
 81. Lemley, supra note 23, at 655 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)). 
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pursue a reasonable royalty, potentially obtaining a greater recovery 
in the process.82  
Section 284 does not contain explicit guidance on how courts or 
juries should determine what royalty is “reasonable.” However, 
courts frequently have attempted to answer this question using a 
legal fiction: creating a hypothetical bargain between the parties for 
use of the patented technology.83 This methodology, often “called 
the ‘hypothetical negotiation’ or the ‘willing licensor-willing 
licensee’ approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the 
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated a[] 
[licensing] agreement just before infringement began.”84 As the 
Federal Circuit recently explained: “The hypothetical negotiation 
tries, as best as possible, to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation 
scenario and to describe the resulting agreement. In other words, if 
infringement had not occurred, willing parties would have executed 
a license agreement specifying a certain royalty payment scheme.”85 
Consequently, this approach attempts to approximate a market for 
the patented technology as it would have developed absent 
infringement.86 
 
 82. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(affirming a jury award of reasonable royalty damages of $40 per bag of soybean seed, which 
was more than six times greater than plaintiff’s lost profits). 
 83. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. Another, less common alternative method is the 
“analytical approach,” which focuses on the infringer’s projected profit from the infringing 
product. Id. Under this methodology, a reasonable royalty is calculated through a profit-
sharing approach, where the infringer would share a substantial portion of its anticipated 
profits from infringement with the patentee. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 
895, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming special master’s award of 30% royalty rate for 
accused product with anticipated net profit of 37%–42%, after subtracting industry standard net 
profit of 6.5%–12.5%). As one district court has explained: 
The analytical method is based on the premise that any rate of return in excess of a 
normal rate of return can be attributed to the patent. This method takes the profits 
of the infringer, subtracts the infringer’s normal profit, and awards some portion of 
the remainder to the patent owner. 
Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1431, 2006 WL 1390416, at 
*7 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006) (quoting Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Calculating 
Intellectual Property Damages); see also SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 3:4. 
 84. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. 
 85. Id. at 1325. 
 86. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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Interestingly, the idea of a hypothetical negotiation predates the 
Georgia-Pacific test by several decades. For instance, in 1938, the 
Sixth Circuit held: 
In fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the sum 
allowed should be reasonable and that which would be accepted by 
a prudent licensee who wished to obtain a license but was not so 
compelled and a prudent patentee, who wished to grant a license 
but was not so compelled. In other words, the sum should be that 
amount which a person desiring to use a patented machine and sell 
its product at a reasonable profit would pay.87 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit explained in 1952 that 
[a] reasonable royalty is an amount which a person, desiring to use 
a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to 
pay as a royalty and yet be able to use the patented article at a 
reasonable profit. The primary inquiry, often complicated by 
secondary ones, is what the parties would have agreed upon, if both 
were reasonably trying to reach an agreement.88 
The hypothetical negotiation framework has been subject to 
significant criticism, most notably for its premise that both parties to 
the negotiation would assume the asserted claims were both valid 
and infringed—issues that are often contested in both real-life 
licensing negotiations and litigation.89 This is not a trivial 
assumption, since a significant percentage of patents are found either 
invalid or not infringed during litigation.90 In addition, the 
 
 87. Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335–36 (6th Cir. 1938); 
see also Recovery in Patent Suits, supra note 50, at 849 (“A reasonable royalty may be defined 
as the amount that a person desiring to use a patent would be willing to pay for its use and a 
patent owner desiring to license the patent would be willing to accept.”). 
 88. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1952) (footnote omitted). 
 89. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent 
Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 914 (2009). But see Blair & Cotter, supra note 
69, at 41 (asserting that this assumption “nevertheless makes economic sense, because an 
award that reflected the parties’ uncertainty at the time of the hypothetical negotiations in 
effect would require the plaintiff to bear the risk of uncertainty twice: first, at the time of those 
negotiations, and second when deciding whether to proceed to trial”). 
 90. See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 3–6 (2006) (finding that less than 25% of patent owners prevailed to judgment in 
patent litigation in 2002–2004). Another study found that approximately half (46%) of patents 
litigated to judgment are invalid. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); see also Jay P. Kesan & 
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hypothetical negotiation unrealistically assumes a state of perfect 
information—that each side knows all of the facts available to the 
other side at the time of the negotiation.91  
Finally, the hypothetical negotiation is potentially unrealistic 
because it assumes that the parties could have reached an agreement 
to license the patent at all. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, in 
a normal licensing negotiation, the potential licensee has three 
alternatives: (1) agree to a royalty payment; (2) infringe the patent 
and risk litigation; or (3) forego use of the patented invention 
entirely.92 The hypothetical negotiation assumes the first alternative, 
when in reality the second actually occurred.93  
An economically realistic hypothetical negotiation, however, 
must also account for the third alternative: that the potential licensee 
would not have used the patented technology at all. For example, 
faced with an exorbitant licensing demand for the patented 
technology, a rational licensee would explore reasonable alternatives, 
such as developing or licensing a substitute technology.94 In other 
words, a rational actor would consider the “best alternative to a 
 
Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the 
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 275–76 (2006) 
(estimating based on empirical data that “on the order of 300 improvidently granted patents 
were invalidated each year in the mid-1990s”). 
 91. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (explaining that the hypothetical negotiation “contemplate[s] a marshaling of 
all of the pertinent facts which, like cards dealt face up, are for all to see”). In certain 
circumstances, however, “factual developments occurring after the date of the hypothetical 
negotiation can inform the damages calculation.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 
F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed.Cir. 2009) (quoting Sinclair Ref. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 
U.S. 689, 698 (1933)); see also Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the hypothetical negotiation “permits and often requires a 
court to look to events and facts that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known 
to or predicted by the hypothesized negotiators”). For example, the Federal Circuit has 
suggested that evidence regarding the accused infringer’s post-infringement usage of the 
patented technology is permissible in a Georgia-Pacific analysis. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1333–34. 
 92. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1576. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 607 (D. 
Del. 2007) (holding that “the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would consider available, or 
soon to be available, alternatives to the infringing product”); Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 
Inc., v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-01431, 2006 WL 1646113, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2006) 
(“[A] key part of the reasonable royalty determination under Georgia Pacific is whether the 
accused infringer had acceptable non-infringing alternatives available to it at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation.”). 
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negotiated agreement” (BATNA).95 Thus, in a hypothetical licensing 
scenario, if a licensor insisted on a royalty that exceeded the expected 
cost of a substitute, then the licensee would simply forego use of the 
patent and switch to the substitute.96 
Despite these shortcomings, however, the hypothetical 
negotiation provides a useful framework for a reasonable royalty 
analysis. It recognizes that the determination of a royalty involves a 
zero-sum game, and focuses on the parties’ relative bargaining 
strengths at the time infringement began.97 Both parties are assumed 
to behave as rational and prudent businesspeople—or, as one court 
put it, the negotiation involves the parties’ “perfectly reasonable 
avatars.”98 They bargain in the face of shared information about key 
facts, such as the infringer’s anticipated profits for the accused 
product99 and whether and at what cost the infringer could have 
switched to a noninfringing substitute.100 Some versions of the 
hypothetical negotiation also sensibly recognize that the royalty 
amount cannot prevent the hypothetical licensee from making a 
reasonable profit101—otherwise, a rational licensee would have 
 
 95. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104–06 (1981).  
 96. See infra Part V.A. 
 97. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547, 
606 (D. Del. 1997) (explaining that a “hypothetical negotiation” involves arm’s length 
bargaining between the potential licensor and licensee) (citing Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign 
Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 98. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.R.I. 2009). 
 99. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
 100. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding 
that availability of a noninfringing substitute “is a factor relevant to the determination of a 
proper royalty during hypothetical negotiations” and that the accused infringer “would have 
been in a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it had a competitive 
noninfringing device ‘in the wings’”). 
 101. See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that a reasonable royalty is the amount that a hypothetical licensee 
“‘would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make, use, or sell the patented article, 
in the market, at a reasonable profit’” (quoting Trans-World Mfg. Corp., 750 F.2d at 1568 
(internal brackets omitted))); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 
1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that “a reasonable royalty would leave an infringer with 
reasonable profit” (quoting Square Liner 360°, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 377 (8th Cir. 
1982))); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (“[T]he very definition of a reasonable royalty assumes that, after payment, the infringer 
will be left with a profit.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). But see Monsanto Co. v. 
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pursued the third alternative described above and foregone use of 
the patented invention. As a result, while far from perfect, the 
hypothetical negotiation is a useful heuristic for a jury to determine 
what royalty would “fulfill[] the statutory mandate of being 
‘reasonable.’”102 
C. The Rise of Georgia-Pacific 
For four decades, the calculation of a reasonable royalty has been 
heavily influenced by the fifteen-factor test first articulated by the 
district court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood 
Corp.103 This test was subsequently adopted by the Federal Circuit 
shortly after its inception,104 as well as one of its predecessor courts, 
the Court of Claims.105 Georgia-Pacific has been called the “gold 
standard” and “universally accepted test” for determining reasonable 
royalty damages.106 A brief review of the Georgia-Pacific case, 
however, helps illuminate the test’s somewhat surprising and case-
specific origins. 
The dispute between Georgia-Pacific and its rival in the plywood 
market, United States Plywood, began in 1955, when Georgia-
Pacific introduced plywood panels that were striated, or grooved, for 
decorative effect.107 Striation prevented the plywood from tending to 
expand and shrink under changing moisture conditions, which 
resulted in cracks over a period of time. In addition, it made the 
plywood more aesthetically pleasing.108 Georgia-Pacific’s striated 
 
Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “the law does not require that an 
infringer be permitted to make a profit”). 
 102. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 24. 
 103. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 104. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1077. 
 105. See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (concluding 
that “the best method of computing compensation in this case is to adopt the approach of 
establishing a reasonable royalty . . . . exemplified by the Georgia-Pacific case”). After its 
creation, the Federal Circuit adopted previous decisions of the Court of Claims as binding 
precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 106. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628–29; see also PAUL M. JANICKE, MODERN 
PATENT LITIGATION 56 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that Georgia-Pacific “still is the most often 
cited source . . . about determining a ‘reasonable royalty’”). 
 107. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 126–29 (2d Cir. 
1958). 
 108. Id. at 126–27. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 12:58 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1682 
plywood competed with U.S. Plywood’s own striated plywood 
product, Weldtex, which practiced a patent issued in 1942 to Deskey 
and assigned to U.S. Plywood.109  
For unknown reasons, Georgia-Pacific delivered a sample of its 
new striated plywood to U.S. Plywood shortly after introducing it on 
the market.110 Immediately afterwards, U.S. Plywood’s president sent 
a short letter to Georgia-Pacific, asserting that Weldtex was 
protected by several U.S. patents111 and stating that U.S. Plywood 
would take “vigorous action to protect our patent rights.”112 
Georgia-Pacific then filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
Southern District of New York for invalidity and noninfringement. 
A case of almost Dickensian proportion ensued.113 In October 
1956, the district court found the Deskey patent invalid and not 
infringed by Georgia-Pacific.114 On appeal, however, the Second 
Circuit reversed, holding in 1958 that claim 1 of the Deskey patent 
was valid and infringed by Georgia-Pacific, and remanded for a 
determination on damages.115 The district court then referred the 
case to a special master to calculate damages.116 After receiving 
testimony and briefing over a three-year period, the special master 
filed a report in 1961 awarding $685,837 in damages to U.S. 
Plywood based on disgorgement of Georgia-Pacific’s ill-gotten 
profits.117 However, the special master rejected U.S. Plywood’s claim 
for its own lost profits under § 284, finding that it had failed to 
adequately establish the quantity of product and amount of profit 
lost due to Georgia-Pacific’s infringement.118 
Both parties filed objections to the special master’s report, and in 
1965—ten years after the case started—the district court held in a 
lengthy opinion that a reasonable royalty, not Georgia-Pacific’s 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 127. 
 111. Two other plywood-related patents, called the Bailey patents, were referenced in the 
dispute, but the Second Circuit held that these patents “were never in issue in the district 
court.” Id. at 126. 
 112. Id. at 127.  
 113. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853). 
 114. 148 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 115. 258 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 116. 243 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
 117. Id. at 512–13. 
 118. Id. at 513. 
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profits, was the proper measure of damages.119 From 1967 through 
1969, the district court held multiple hearings and received extensive 
briefing on the issue of an appropriate reasonable royalty.120 But the 
assigned judge (Judge William B. Herlands) died in August 1969 
before he could issue an opinion.121 Judge Herlands, however, had 
“substantially completed” a draft opinion, which the newly-assigned 
judge, Judge Charles H. Tenney, considered and adopted in May 
1970 “with minor amendment[s].”122 
First, the district court explained that “[a] comprehensive list of 
evidentiary facts relevant, in general, to the determination of a 
reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a 
conspectus of the leading cases.”123 Rather than including a 
“comprehensive” list of factors, however, the opinion identified only 
“some of the factors mutatis mutandis”124 that were “seemingly 
more pertinent to the issue herein.”125 The first factor related to a so-
called established royalty:  
 1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the 
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.126 
Factors 2 through 13 addressed a wide variety of considerations 
at issue in the case, including the relationship of the licensing parties; 
the type of license they likely would agree upon; comparable licenses 
made by the licensee and in the relevant industry more generally; the 
nature, benefits, extent of use, and alternatives to the patented 
technology; and the value of features unrelated to the patent:  
 
 119. Id. at 503, 514–46. 
 120. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1118–19 & n.3. 
 123. Id. at 1120. 
 124. “Mutatis mutandis” is a Latin phrase that means “[a]ll necessary changes having 
been made” or “with the necessary changes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (8th ed. 2004). 
Use of this phrase in the Georgia-Pacific decision “strongly suggests to future readers that this 
particular list in its form may not be suitable or appropriate for application in future cases.” 
Nathaniel C. Love, Comment, Nominal Reasonable Royalties for Patent Infringement, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1754 n.28 (2008). 
 125. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
 126. Id. 
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 2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents 
comparable to the patent in suit. 
 3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-
exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or 
with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold. 
 4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to 
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the 
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed 
to preserve that monopoly. 
 5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and 
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory 
in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and 
promoter. 
 6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales 
of other products of the licensee; that existing value of the 
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented 
items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. 
 7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
 8. The established profitability of the product made under the 
patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity. 
 9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old 
modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out 
similar results. 
 10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the 
commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the 
licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention. 
 11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the 
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use. 
 12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be 
customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to 
allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 
 13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited 
to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the 
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manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or 
improvements added by the infringer.127 
Factor 14 restated the longstanding rule, first codified in the 
1922 Act,128 that expert testimony could be offered regarding an 
appropriate reasonable royalty: 
 14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.129 
Finally, Factor 15 adopted the hypothetical negotiation 
framework that had been previously articulated by the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits:130 
 15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a 
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the 
time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and 
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which 
a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to 
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article 
embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to 
pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and 
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee 
who was willing to grant a license.131 
Surprisingly, the district court’s list of factors did not include any 
citations to previous case law.132 
Explaining that “there is no formula by which . . . [they] can be 
rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by which 
their economic significance can be automatically transduced into 
their pecuniary equivalent,” the district court declined to explain 
how it balanced these factors.133 Rather, the court said that it would 
exercise “judicial discretion”134 to consider “all pertinent factors” 
based on the evidence.135  
 
 127. Id.  
 128. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 129. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.   
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.  
 131. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.  
 132. See id.  
 133. Id. at 1120–21. 
 134. Id. at 1120 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 942 (6th Cir. 
1937).  
 135. Id. at 1120–21. 
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Similar to most current patent infringement litigation, the parties 
in Georgia-Pacific proffered widely diverging royalty calculations. 
Georgia-Pacific claimed that an appropriate royalty was between 
$1.50 and $3 per thousand square feet of plywood. U.S. Plywood, 
however, asserted that the royalty should be at least an order of 
magnitude greater—$50 per thousand square feet.136  
In its decision, the district court placed particular emphasis on 
several of the above-listed factors in attempting to set a reasonable 
royalty. First, it relied heavily on Factor 8—in particular, that before 
Georgia-Pacific’s infringement, U.S. Plywood had enjoyed large 
profits on Weldtex (on average, approximately $48 per thousand 
square feet).137 It also considered Factors 4 and 5 at length, 
emphasizing that U.S. Plywood had a policy of maintaining its 
patent monopoly on striated plywood in the United States and was 
unwilling to license this technology to a powerful competitor like 
Georgia-Pacific.138 Third, the court put significant weight on Factor 
13, holding that the patented technology—and not other features—
caused Weldtex and Georgia-Pacific’s own striated plywood product 
to be highly profitable.139 In contrast, the court placed little or no 
weight on other factors, such as foreign licenses granted under the 
patent and other, plywood-related licenses entered into by Georgia-
Pacific (Factors 2 and 12). Ultimately, the district court concluded 
that U.S. Plywood’s proposed royalty of $50 per thousand square 
feet of plywood represented “a fair and reasonable royalty” and 
entered judgment in the amount of $800,000.140 
Most accounts of Georgia-Pacific end with the district court 
opinion.141 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit rebalanced some 
of the factors considered and significantly reduced the district court’s 
 
 136. Id. at 1119. 
 137. Id. at 1127–29. 
 138. See id. at 1123–25. 
 139. See id. at 1134 (holding that “[t]here is no basis for [Georgia-Pacific]’s argument 
that the value of striated fir plywood is significantly attributable to elements other than the 
Deskey patent” and that “the commercial success of Weldtex was the result of deep striation of 
the face, Deskey’s invention, which created a new type of plywood panel”). 
 140. Id. at 1143. 
 141. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631 (“[I]t is the district court’s opinion 
that has become gospel in the patent damages world.”). 
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award.142 While the Second Circuit sustained all of the district court’s 
basic factual findings,143 it held that the lower court erred in not 
giving sufficient weight to Factor 15—that in a hypothetical 
negotiation, the “reasonable ‘royalty must be fixed so as to leave the 
infringer, or suppositious licensee, a reasonable profit.’”144 
Specifically, it explained that the district court found that at the time 
infringement began, Georgia-Pacific reasonably expected to earn 
profits similar to U.S. Plywood, calculated at about $48 per 
thousand square feet. But the awarded royalty of $50 per square feet 
would “gobble[] up all of [Georgia-Pacific]’s expected profit.”145 
Based on this, the Second Circuit adjusted the reasonable royalty 
rate downward to $35.65, lowering Georgia-Pacific’s total damages 
by nearly one-third.146 
The Georgia-Pacific case differs from many current patent 
infringement cases in several important ways. First, it involved two 
direct competitors with highly similar products. This is unlike a 
substantial portion of current patent litigation, which involves 
nonpracticing entities that do not offer products or services in 
competition with the accused infringer.147  
Second, the accused product in Georgia-Pacific—striated 
plywood—was relatively simple, and the patented technology 
accounted for most, if not all, of the product’s value. In contrast, 
many modern patent cases involve complex products containing 
dozens or even hundreds of features, of which the patented 
technology may be a relatively small part.148 Further, Georgia-Pacific 
involved a product covered by a single patent (or at most a handful 
 
 142. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
 143. Id. at 297. 
 144. Id. at 299 (quoting Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1122). 
 145. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that the district court’s total award of $800,000 
exceeded the amount that the special master found to be Georgia-Pacific’s actual profits from 
the infringement ($685,837). Id. 
 146. Id. at 300. 
 147. See supra Part III.A. 
 148. See, e.g., infra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining that Apple has been 
sued for alleged infringements of more than 120 patents relating to the iPhone and that the 
iPhone has also licensed many more patents through various standards). 
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of U.S. Plywood patents). Today, however, many accused high-
technology products practice numerous patents.149  
Finally—and perhaps most significantly—damages in the 
Georgia-Pacific case, like most patent infringement litigation at that 
time, were tried to and determined by a judge, who had the time 
and expertise to consider complicated financial and technological 
evidence and prepare a detailed opinion explaining the court’s 
findings and conclusions.150 In contrast, today most patent litigation 
is tried before a jury,151 which often has less time and expertise than a 
judge, and which cannot be required to make detailed written 
findings for scrutiny in post-trial review.152 The cumulative impact of 
these differences will be discussed in the following section. 
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF GEORGIA-PACIFIC  
IN MODERN PATENT LITIGATION 
“Determining a fair and reasonable royalty . . . seem[s] often to 
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”153 
As explained below, application of the forty-year-old Georgia-
Pacific test in modern patent infringement litigation is often 
problematic and may lead to overcompensation of the patentee. 
Indeed, the Georgia-Pacific test is particularly inappropriate in cases 
involving complex products incorporating a wide array of high-tech 
components or features. Even when the accused product is less 
complex, Georgia-Pacific gives juries little guidance on how to weigh 
the numerous factors and reach a decision on an appropriate royalty. 
Finally, the amorphous, “black box” nature of Georgia-Pacific makes 
it difficult for courts to review a jury award in post-trial proceedings 
to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. 
 
 149. This phenomenon is called “royalty stacking.” See infra Part IV.A. 
 150. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 489–95 (1997). 
 151. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek 
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 (2000) (finding that from 1968–1970, juries 
tried only 2.8% of patent cases; in “contrast, from 1997–1999, 59% of all patent trials were 
tried to juries”). 
 152. See infra Part IV.D (recounting scholarly criticism about the comparative 
competency of decision-making by juries compared to judges in complex, lengthy litigation).  
 153. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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A. Royalty Stacking  
One major issue with Georgia-Pacific is that it does not 
effectively address royalty stacking. Royalty stacking exists when a 
single, technologically complex product potentially practices 
numerous patents, and thus “may bear multiple royalty burdens.”154 
As the Senate Judiciary Committee has recently explained, “[l]ong 
past is the day in which the typical invention is a sui generis 
creation.”155 This was the case in Georgia-Pacific itself, where a 
single patent covered the entire product.156 Rather, “today’s patents 
are often combinations, and many products . . . [practice] dozens, if 
not hundreds or even thousands of patents, and the infringed patent 
may well be one smaller part of a much larger whole.”157  
Royalty stacking “reflects the fact that, from the perspective of 
the firm making the product in question, all of the different claims 
for royalties must be added or ‘stacked’ together to determine the 
total royalty burden borne by the product.”158 This is a particularly 
difficult issue in the information technology, electronics, and 
telecommunications industries, where a single integrated product 
may include hundreds of separate components.159 As a result, a 
complex product could potentially infringe—and thus require 
licensing agreements for—scores of patents owned by numerous 
different entities. For example, Apple’s iPhone has been accused of 
infringing over 120 separate patents held by dozens of plaintiffs.160 
 
 154. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 123–
24 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf. 
 155. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 12 (2008). 
 156. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970); see also id. (“[T]he contribution of the [patented] invention cannot be isolated as a 
separate physical part. The invention permeated the [accused Georgia-Pacific] plywood panel 
to such a degree that it should be considered as covering the article as a whole.”). 
 157. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 12. 
 158. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 1993. 
 159. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19. 
 160. Plaintiff VirnetX Inc.’s Original Complaint at 7–10, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 
No. 6:10-cv-00417-LED (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes two 
U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2–3, Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 
1:10-cv-05713-PKC (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent 
No. 6,389,473, which claims methods for real-time broadcasting over a network); Third 
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Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 15–18, MONKEYmedia, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 
No. 1:10-cv-00319-SS (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2010) (asserting that iOS 4, which is the current 
version of the iPhone operating system, infringes two U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent 
Infringement at 12–23, NTP, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00467-JRS (E.D. Va. July 8, 
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes eight U.S. patents regarding wireless email); 
Complaint for Patent Infringement at 11, 25, 39–40, Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices., Inc., 
No. 2:10-cv-00207-TJW (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes three 
U.S. patents involving “integrated circuits using embedded flash memory”); Complaint for 
Patent Infringement at 10–11, 19–20, UO! IP of Del., LLC v. ABBYY USA Software House, 
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00445-LPS (D. Del. May 27, 2010) (asserting that iPhone infringes two 
U.S. patents involving language translation software); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 
17–21, Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00428-SLR (D. Del. May 21, 
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes two U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent 
Infringement at 2–3, SoftView LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00389-LPS (D. Del. May 10, 
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,461,353, entitled “Scalable 
Display of Internet Content on Mobile Devices”); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 
Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00249-wmc (W.D. Wis. May 7, 2010) (asserting that 
the iPhone infringes five Nokia patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement and Demand for 
Jury Trial at 2, NetAirus Techs. LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03257-GAF-E (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 30, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,103,380); Complaint for 
Patent Infringement at 6–17, MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00258-SLR 
(D. Del. Mar. 31, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes thirteen U.S. patents); Complaint 
for Patent Infringement at passim, Microunity Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Acer, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
00091-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes twelve U.S. 
patents regarding microprocessor technology); Complaint at 7, ADC Tech. Inc. v. LG Elecs. 
Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01456 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010) (asserting that the 
iPhone infringes 3 U.S. patents); Complaint at 8–12, Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Nike, Inc., 
No. 2:10-cv-00054-DF-CE (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone, in 
conjunction with the Nike+ line of products, infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 7,062,225, 
7,251,454, and 7,519,327); Complaint at 2–4, Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 
1:10-cv-00586 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 
7,310,416 and 7,266,186); Complaint and Jury Claim at 2–4, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Apple, 
Inc., No. 6:10-cv-06021-MAT-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone 
infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,292,218 and 5,493,335); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 
2, 6, St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00804-LPS (D. 
Del. Oct. 26, 2009) (asserting infringement of four U.S. patents by the iPhone’s digital 
camera); Complaint for Patent Infringement and Declaratory Judgment at 1, Nokia Corp. v. 
Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00791-GMS (D. Del. Oct. 22, 2009) (asserting that the iPhone 
violates ten patents for wireless transmission technologies); Fifth Amended Complaint for 
Patent Infringement at 6–7, EMG Tech., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00447-LED (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 20, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,020,845 and 7,441,196); 
Second Amended Complaint and Application for Permanent Injunction at 7–9, Bandspeed, 
Inc. v. Sony Elecs. Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00593-LY (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2009) (asserting, inter 
alia, infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,027,418 and 7,570,614); Complaint for Patent 
Infringement at 42, Xpoint Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00628-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 
21, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 5,913,028); First 
Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 9, 11–12, Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. 
Apple, Inc., No. 5:09-cva-05128-BSM (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2009) (asserting infringement of 
U.S. Patent Nos. 5,712,664 and 6,081,279 by, inter alia, the iPhone); Second Amended 
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And this figure does not include the hundreds or thousands of 
patents licensed by Apple as part of the iPhone’s use of the Wi-Fi 
and 3G data transmission standards.161 Royalty stacking is also a 
potential issue in the biotechnology field, where a “‘dense web of 
 
Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2, 7–8, MSTG, Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., No. 
1:08-cv-07411 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes three 
U.S. patents); Original Complaint at 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, BTG Int’l Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:09-
cv-00223-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes 
five U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 4–6, Pers. Audio, LLC v. Apple, 
Inc., No: 9:09-cv-00111-RC (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. 
Patent Nos. 6,199,076 and 7,509,178); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 5–6, SPH 
Am., LLC v. Nokia Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00701-GBL-TCB (E.D. Va. filed June 25, 2009) 
(asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. RE 40,385 by, inter alia, the iPhone); Complaint 
for Patent Infringement at 1–3, Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-
01531-RS (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,825,352); 
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 3, Accolade Sys. LLC v. 
Micron Tech., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00086-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009) (asserting, inter 
alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,463,298); Complaint at 2–5, Affinity Labs of 
Tex., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09-cv-00047-RC (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009) (asserting 
infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,187,947, 7,440,772, and 7,486,926); Complaint for 
Patent Infringement at 2–3, MONEC Holding AG v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00312-LMB-
JFA (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,335,678); 
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 5–6, Typhoon Touch Techs., 
Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-00546-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, 
that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 5,379,057 and 5,675,362); Complaint at 2–3, 
Picsel (Research) Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00100-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2009) 
(asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,009,626); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 
3, Cygnus Sys., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:08-cv-02337-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2008) 
(asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,346,850); Complaint at 9–
22, WiAV Solutions LLC v. Research In Motion Ltd., No. 3:08-cv-00627-REP (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 26, 2008) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes ten U.S. patents); First 
Amended Complaint at 6–9, Saxon Innovations, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00265-JDL 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2008) (asserting, inter alia, infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,530,597 
and 5,247,621); Amended Complaint at 3, Figa v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10304-NG (D. 
Mass. Mar. 21, 2008) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,924,496); Original 
Complaint at 3–5, Mirror Worlds LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00088-LED (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 14, 2008) (asserting infringement by iPhone of three U.S. patents); Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial at 2–3, Minerva Indus., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00019-CE 
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,321,783); Complaint 
for Patent Infringement at 4–5, Klausner Techs. Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00525-LED-
JDL (E.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2007) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,572,576 and 
5,283,818); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2, SP Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:07-
cv-00367-JDL (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2007) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 
6,784,873). Notably, this tally does not include allegations of infringement that have not 
resulted in litigation.  
 161. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining that the wireless 3G standard 
may implicate thousands of patents). 
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overlapping intellectual property rights’” may require companies to 
obtain numerous licenses.162  
Royalty stacking can also present a problem for industry 
standards, such as those for consumer electronics or 
telecommunications networks. This problem has been partially 
addressed in some cases by pooling the “essential” patents held by 
multiple parties together and assigning a single entity to handle 
licensing for the entire patent pool.163 For example, the pool of 
patents covering the DVD standard offers nonexclusive licenses for 
210 “essential” patents on behalf of three separate firms.164 But if a 
standard becomes popular, and a patent reading on the standard is 
not licensed as part of a pool, the patent can confer significant 
market power to its owner.165 As the Third Circuit recently explained 
in an antitrust case:  
A [standard-setting organization] may complete its lengthy process 
of evaluating technologies and adopting a new standard, only to 
discover that certain technologies essential to implementing the 
standard are patented. When this occurs, the patent holder is in a 
position to “hold up” industry participants from implementing the 
standard. Industry participants who have invested significant 
resources developing products and technologies that conform to 
the standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their 
 
 162. Vincent J. Napoleon, Impact of Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent 
Strategies for Biotechnology, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 25 (2008) (quoting Shapiro, 
supra note 154, at 120). But see John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (disputing the anticommons problem and 
concluding that “drug discovery has not been substantially impeded” by overlapping patent 
rights in biotechnology); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical 
Anticommons?, REG., Summer 2004, at 54 (arguing that “Heller and Eisenberg have 
overstated the case against patent protection at both the theoretical and empirical levels”). See 
generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (May 1, 1998). 
 163. See Shapiro, supra note 154, at 134 (“A patent pool involves a single entity . . . that 
licenses the patents of two or more companies to third parties as a package.”). Some patent 
pools have an “independent patent expert” that “determine[s] whether a patent in the pool is 
in fact essential.” Id. at 134–35. 
 164. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell 4 (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf. 
 165. Shapiro, supra note 154, at 136. 
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investment and switch to another standard. They will have become 
“locked in” to the standard.166 
For complex technologies like the 3G wireless standard, where 
literally thousands of patents may be implicated,167 the royalty 
stacking issue is readily apparent: if each patentee claimed only a few 
percentage points of an accused product’s price as a “reasonable” 
royalty, the licensing costs would quickly swallow up the product’s 
profit margin. And this is not merely a hypothetical problem, as 
Microsoft learned in its MP3 patent litigation with Lucent—the jury 
awarded Lucent a $1.53 billion royalty for infringement of two 
MP3-related patents, even though Microsoft had already licensed 
other “essential” patents for the MP3 standard for significantly 
less.168 
While one Georgia-Pacific factor theoretically can address the 
problem of royalty stacking—Factor 13 (the portion of profit that 
should be credited to the patented technology)—several practical 
difficulties prevent it from effectively doing so. First, under Georgia-
Pacific, royalty rates are often calculated as a percentage of the entire 
product’s sales price or profitability, which serves to obscure the 
value of other technologies in the accused product. For example, in 
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,169 plaintiff Cornell 
University (“Cornell”) prevailed at trial on its claim that Hewlett-
Packard’s (“HP”) CPU bricks170 for computer servers and 
workstations infringed Cornell’s patent for an improved method and 
apparatus for issuing multiple “computer processor instructions in a 
single machine clock cycle.”171 After trial, however, Federal Circuit 
Judge Rader, sitting by designation, granted HP’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law against Cornell’s proffered royalty 
calculation because Cornell’s claimed royalty base—the CPU 
 
 166. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 167. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2025–28. 
 168. Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007); see also 
Douglas Heingartner, Patent Fights Are a Legacy of MP3’s Tangled Origins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 2007, at C3. 
 169. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 170. “CPU bricks” are modules that contain a central processing unit (“CPU”) 
“combined with a temperature controlling thermal solution, external cache memory, and a 
power converter.” Id. at 283. 
 171. Id. 
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bricks—“incorporated much more [technology] than the claimed 
invention.”172 As a result, Judge Rader concluded that Cornell had 
impermissibly sought “economic entitlement to damages based on 
technology beyond the scope” of the patented invention.173  
Second, in the context of royalty stacking, Georgia-Pacific’s 
emphasis on royalty rates for comparable licenses may conflict with 
economic reality. Factor 12 instructs the jury to consider customary 
industry licensing rates for similar technology.174 While this appears 
sensible at first glance, it presents significant problems for complex 
products that practice numerous patents. Frequently, patent holders 
claim that they should be awarded a royalty rate at least as high as 
those prevalent in the same field of technology, which may range 
from 1% to over 10%, depending on the industry.175 These 
arguments are often successful, as patentees frequently receive 
reasonable royalties in excess of 10% at trial.176 This is generally not a 
problem for cases where, like Georgia-Pacific itself, the accused 
product is covered by a single patent. However, such royalty rates are 
economically unsustainable for complex products that practice 
numerous patents. Even if a product has a high profit margin—say 
50%177—a few such licenses would either consume the product’s 
 
 172. Id. at 284. 
 173. Id. at 284–85; see also id. at 283 (criticizing Cornell’s damages expert for basing 
Cornell’s royalty claim on Hewlett-Packard’s “servers and systems [that] include vast amounts 
of technology beyond the infringing part of the processors”). 
 174. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
 175. See, e.g., Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C02-00790 SI, 2009 WL 
975424, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (offering evidence that infringer entered into eight 
prior licensing agreements with royalty rates of 3.7% to 4.6%, and that the royalty rates for the 
industry are between 2% to 6%; the court ultimately awarded a royalty rate of 5.1%); 
Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601, 607 (D. Del. 2007) 
(relying on reports that industry licenses range from 4.7% to 11.9% for the chemical industry 
and 7.3% to 9.6% for biotechnology to claim—and receive—a royalty rate of 20% from the 
court); Hynix Semiconductors, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. CV-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 
1991760, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2006) (relying on stated median royalty rate of 3.2% for 
the electronics industry to calculate proposed damages). 
 176. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have found that the average royalty rate in all 
reasonable royalty cases is 13.1% of the infringing product’s price. Lemley & Shapiro, supra 
note 154, at 2032. 
 177. For example, one estimate has pegged the profit margin on Apple’s iPhone as 
approximately 58%. Turley Muller, Apple Inc. (AAPL): iPhone’s Substantial Impact on Gross 
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entire profit or produce a Cournot complements effect,178 whereby 
the aggregate impact of multiple, above-market royalty agreements 
would cause the producer to raise prices on the accused product, 
leading to an economically inefficient outcome.179 This result would 
be contrary to the requirement that a reasonable royalty must permit 
the licensee “‘to make, use, or sell the patented article, in the market, 
at a reasonable profit.’”180 
 Third, the royalty stacking issue can be compounded by 
application of the so-called “rule of thumb.” The “rule of thumb” 
suggests that a patent licensee should pay a royalty of 25%181 of the 
expected profit from the product incorporating the patent.182 
According to some proponents, the “rule of thumb” represents an 
easily-applied method to apportion a technology’s value between the 
 
Margin, FINANCIAL ALCHEMIST, July 29, 2009, http://financial-alchemist.blogspot.com/ 
2009/07/apple-inc-aapl-iphones-substantial.html (July 29, 2009). 
 178. As Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have explained, the Cournot complements effect 
occurs “when multiple input owners each charge more than marginal cost for their input, 
thereby raising the price of the downstream product and reducing sales of that product.” 
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2013. See generally AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES 
INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (W.J. Ashley ed., 
Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., MacMillan Company 1897) (1838). 
 179. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2013, 2015–16. 
 180. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (quoting Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal brackets omitted)); see also Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 
718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that it “is implicit” that “a reasonable 
royalty would leave an infringer with a reasonable profit” (internal quotations and citation 
omitted)); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (noting that “the very definition of a reasonable royalty assumes that, after payment, 
‘the infringer be left with a profit’”) (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 
243 F. Supp. 500, 539 (S.D.N.Y 1965)). But see Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 
1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “the law does not require that an infringer be 
permitted to make a profit” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2004))).  
 181. Some versions of the “rule of thumb” describe the royalty as a range from 25% to 
33% of expected profits that may be adjusted upwards or downwards. See, e.g., Novozymes 
A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (D. Del. 2007); Std. Mfg. Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 766 (1999); see also RUSSELL PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES: A LITIGATION SUPPORT HANDBOOK (1999) (asserting that the 
rule of thumb “calculates a royalty as 25% to 33 1/3% of the gross profit, before taxes, from 
the enterprise operations in which the licensed intellectual property is used”). 
 182. See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
423, 425 (2003–2004). 
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licensor and licensee.183 Several Georgia-Pacific factors are implicated 
by the “rule of thumb,” including Factors 8 (profitability and 
commercial success of the product practicing the patent) and 12 
(portion of profit customary in the industry to use the invention). 
Although the “rule of thumb” has been utilized by patentees as 
part of the Georgia-Pacific analysis,184 it has been justly criticized for 
numerous reasons.185 For example, it sets an arbitrary value for the 
patented technology (25%) without considering either the benefits it 
provides over the prior art or the level of its expected use in the 
accused product.186 In addition, it fails to consider the availability of 
potential substitutes to the patented technology and the impact such 
substitutes would have on the parties’ hypothetical negotiations.187 
Furthermore, application of the “rule of thumb” is particularly 
problematic in the context of royalty stacking. For complex products 
covered by dozens or hundreds of patents, if each potential licensor 
demanded a 25% share of the product’s projected profits, four such 
 
 183. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 370 
(2002). See generally Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhern, Use of the 25 Percent 
Rule in Valuing IP, LES NOUVELLES 123 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/otd/files/2009/11/goldscheider-25-percent-rule.pdf. 
 184. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(declining to find plaintiff’s damages expert’s use of 25% rule of thumb unreliable under 
Daubert); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.R.I. 2009), 
rev’d in relevant part,      No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738, at *16-22 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) 
(recognizing that “the rule of thumb calculation” is “widely accepted”); Civix v. Expedia, No. 
03 C 3792, 2005 WL 5961023, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2005) (permitting the patentee’s 
damages expert to use the “rule of thumb” as a methodology to calculate damages); W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics Res. Assocs., Inc., No. CIV 84-559 PHX CLH, 
1990 WL 180490, at *23 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1990) (“As a general rule of thumb, a royalty of 25 
percent of net profits is used in license negotiations.”). 
 185. A detailed criticism of the “rule of thumb” is outside the scope of this Article. For a 
summary of previous criticism, see Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to 
Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 
332–35 (2006). 
 186. See, e.g., Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 241, 251–52 (1997) (explaining that the “rule of thumb” represents 
“an arbitrary fraction” and “does not relate to the value and degree to which the patent can 
exclude substitute products and therefore command a patent profit”); Lauren Johnston Stiroh 
& Richard T. Rapp, Modern Methods for the Valuation of Intellectual Property, 532 PLI/Pat 
817, 823–24 (1998); Roy J. Epstein, Modeling Patent Damages: Rigorous and Defensible 
Calculations 6 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.royepstein.com/ 
epstein_aipla_2003_article_website.pdf (asserting that the rule of thumb is “essentially 
arbitrary” and “divorced from economic analysis”). 
 187. Hagelin, supra note 182, at 426. 
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licenses would consume the entire profit derived from the product. 
No “economically rational” licensee would agree to enter into patent 
licenses where the combined costs would exceed the product’s 
projected profits.188  Recently, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
the Federal Circuit agreed with these criticisms, holding that the 25% 
“rule of thumb” was “arbitrary,” “unreliable,” and a “fundamentally 
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical 
negotiation.”189 
B. Apportionment 
A related problem is the difficulty of assessing the patented 
technology’s value in a complex, high-tech product as compared to 
other, noninfringing features. This inquiry, called apportionment, 
limits damages to the patent holder “to only the losses that are 
attributable to the patented invention.”190 The goal of 
apportionment is to prevent the overcompensation of patent holders 
by precluding recovery of damages for features that go beyond the 
scope of the patent’s exclusive rights.191  
Apportionment has deep roots in patent law192 and is embodied 
in Georgia-Pacific Factor 13, which provides that the jury must 
consider “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be 
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented 
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant 
features or improvements added by the infringer.”193 While a good 
idea in theory, apportionment has proven difficult to implement 
properly in practice. As a practical matter, at trial, juries hear 
 
 188. Id. at 427. 
 189. __ F.3d __, No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738, at *19,*22 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 190. Tim Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder 
Receive When a Permanent Injunction is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REV. 543, 553 (2009). 
 191. See Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages 
Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 ¶¶ 18–20 (2005). 
 192. See, e.g., Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in 
every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the 
patentee’s damages between the patented feature[s] and the unpatented features.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Bensen, supra note 191, ¶ 3 (“[B]etween 1853 and 1915, the 
Supreme Court addressed apportionment more than thirty-five times in patent damages 
decisions, sometimes in two or three decisions in the same year.”). 
 193. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
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extensive evidence from the patent holder regarding the critical 
importance of the patented invention but often receive little or no 
information regarding “all the other things that contribute to the 
success” of the accused product, such as other inventions and the 
contributions of defendants’ own technology and marketing 
efforts.194 Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to explain the 
importance of all the other, noninfringing components and features 
contained in complex products like computer operating systems or 
smartphones—such a presentation likely would take weeks or 
months of highly technical testimony, which few judges would allow 
(and few jurors would want to endure).195 As a result, juries often 
come away from a trial “with an inflated sense of the relative value of 
[the patented] invention” and consequently award a 
disproportionately high royalty.196 
The apportionment problem is aptly illustrated by Lucent v. 
Gateway,197 one of the most recent Federal Circuit cases applying the 
Georgia-Pacific standard. In Lucent, the patented invention was a 
graphical date-picking feature embodied in Microsoft Outlook.198 At 
trial, the jury awarded Lucent approximately $358 million in 
reasonable royalty damages.199 On appeal, however, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the damages award, in part because the jury failed to 
properly consider the value of the patented technology relative to the 
rest of the accused product.200 Although “[t]he parties presented 
little evidence relating to” this Georgia-Pacific factor, the court held 
 
 194. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 29–30 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 
598 F.3d 831, 852–53, 855 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (recounting the argument by plaintiff’s damages 
expert that “the infringing custom XML editor was critical to Microsoft’s sales” of Microsoft 
Word, even though a survey revealed that only 1.9% of all copies of Word “were used in an 
infringing manner”). 
 195. For example, during the January 2007 release of the original iPhone, CEO Steve 
Jobs said that Apple had filed over 200 patent applications related to it. Lev Grossman, The 
Apple of Your Ear, TIME, Jan. 22, 2007, at 48, 54. In addition, a proper apportionment 
analysis would have to take Apple’s highly successful marketing campaign for the iPhone into 
consideration. See, e.g., Ellis Booker, Apple’s Masterful Marketing of iPhone, BTOB, June 17, 
2007, at 8, available at 2007 WLNR 13901677. 
 196. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 194, at 30. 
 197. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 198. Id. at 1317.  
 199. Id. at 1325. 
 200. Id. at 1332, 1338. 
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that “the only reasonable conclusion is that most of the realizable 
profit [from Microsoft Outlook] must be credited to non-patented 
elements.”201 It found that the accused product was “an enormously 
complex software program comprising hundreds, if not thousands or 
even more, [of] features” and that the infringing technology was a 
“tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program.”202 In 
addition, it held that numerous features other than the patented 
technology accounted for the “overwhelming majority of the 
consumer demand,” and the portion of the profit attributable to the 
date-picking feature was “exceedingly small.”203 As a result, it 
appears that juries have great difficulty properly apportioning the 
value of the patented technology under Georgia-Pacific when this 
technology is only one part of a much larger product. 
C. Entire Market Value Rule  
A third problematic issue is application of the “entire market 
value rule” in conjunction with the Georgia-Pacific analysis.204 
Although not part of the Georgia-Pacific test itself, the entire market 
value rule is often invoked by patentees to calculate the royalty base 
for a reasonable royalty award.  
The entire market value rule permits a patentee to recover 
damages based on an entire product when the patentee can establish 
that the patented technology “constitutes the basis for customer 
demand.”205 Thus, “[t]he ‘entire market value’ rule is the corollary 
of apportionment”206—the patentee can recover damages for an 
 
 201. Id. at 1332. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1333. 
 204. Although the entire market value rule is not expressly listed as part of the Georgia-
Pacific test, similar considerations are implicated by numerous factors, including Factor 8 
(commercial success and popularity of the product made under the patent), Factor 10 (nature 
and benefits of the patented invention), Factor 11 (extent and value of use of the patented 
invention in the accused product), and Factor 13 (portion of profit from the accused product 
that should be credited to the patented invention). 
 205. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (quoting TWM Mfg., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 
901 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“We have held that the entire market value rule permits recovery of 
damages based on the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when 
the patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 206. H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 64 (2007). 
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entire product’s value if the patent is the cause for customers to 
demand the product.  
The entire market value rule originated in Supreme Court cases 
involving equitable claims for accounting of an infringer’s profits, 
which were available prior to the 1946 Act. For example, in 
Garretson v. Clark,207 the Court held that  
[w]hen a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely   
new machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what   
particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of          
the machine or contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly                    
from those of the other parts, so that the benefits derived         
from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated. . . . The 
patentee . . . must . . . show, by equally reliable and satisfactory 
evidence, that the profits and damages are to be calculated           
on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the 
whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally 
attributable to the patented feature.208 
The Federal Circuit first adopted the entire market value rule for 
damages based on lost profits.209 Although the entire market value 
rule awards a patentee at least some profits due to unpatented 
contributions, Mark Lemley has explained that its application 
“nonetheless makes a certain amount of sense in lost profits cases 
because, if most of the value of the defendant’s product is 
attributable to the patentee’s technology, it is reasonable to conclude 
that, but for the infringement, the defendant’s customers would have 
bought the product from the [patentee] instead.”210 
However, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,211 the Federal Circuit, 
sitting en banc, asserted that the entire market value rule also 
extended to reasonable royalties,212 a view it has reaffirmed in 
 
 207. 111 U.S. 120 (1884). 
 208. Id. at 121 (emphasis added), quoted in Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337. 
 209. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 210. Lemley, supra note 23, at 663; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent 
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1178 n.137 (2009) (arguing that “if 
the patentee can prove that the defendant’s infringement caused it to lose sales,” the patentee 
should “recover the profits it would have earned on those lost sales”). 
 211. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 212. Id. at 1554–55. 
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subsequent cases.213 This extension to royalties for complex products 
does not make economic sense because a successful claim under the 
entire market value means that the patentee is obtaining a royalty 
based in part on the “unpatented components of a device . . . that 
are part of the same machine.”214 As recent studies have 
demonstrated, this leads to an overcompensation of the patentee.215 
The entire market value rule is also problematic in cases in which 
a reasonable royalty is calculated based on a running royalty. For a 
running royalty, the factfinder must determine “two variables: the 
royalty base and the royalty rate.”216 The royalty base is the value 
base of the products to which the royalty rate is applied.217 Under 
the entire market value rule, however, the patentee can claim any 
group of products containing the patented technology, no matter 
how small a feature or component—for example, an automobile 
containing patented windshield wipers218 or a computer containing a 
software program with an infringing feature219—as the royalty 
base.220 Consequently, a massive damages award can result when a 
large royalty base is combined with a royalty rate of “only” a few 
percentage points.221 As several prominent high-tech companies, 
including Intel, Palm, SAP, and Yahoo!, argued in a recent brief,  
 
 213. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336–37. 
 214. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; see also Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation 
and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2007) (explaining that “[s]ince 
Rite-Hite, courts have frequently applied the entire market value rule to award damages for 
components that are unconnected to the infringing element of the accused device, yet which 
nevertheless function together with the accused device and are sold or marketed in conjunction 
with the infringing article”). 
 215. Lemley, supra note 23, at 663–64; Love, supra note 214, at 272–84; see also Cotter, 
supra note 210, at 1179 n.137 (arguing “that in reasonable royalty cases, the entire market 
value rule is conceptually inappropriate”). 
 216. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (quoting RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF DODD, MODERN 
LICENSING LAW § 7:5 (2008–2009 ed. 2008)). 
 217. NIMMER & DODD, supra note 216, at § 7:7. 
 218. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 219. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338. 
 220. Id. at 1338–39; see also Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“We have held that the entire market value rule permits recovery of damages based on 
the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related 
feature is the basis for customer demand.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
 221. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1309, 1338–40 (finding that the royalty rate of 8% on 
all copies of Microsoft Outlook led to $358 million damages award by the jury). 
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[B]y permitting evidence of the total sales of a complex, multi-
component product, the entire market value rule invites juries to 
start their damages calculation with a very large number, which 
biases juries toward overcompensatory damages awards. . . . The 
likely scenario in such a case is then this: A jury, when presented 
with portfolio licensing exemplars under which royalties may be as 
high as 5–8% of the licensee’s revenues, will combine these high 
rates with evidence showing total sales of a successful, complex 
product and reach a conclusion on damages that bears no 
reasonable relationship to the value of an individual patented 
component.222 
Several recent cases illustrate the flaw of applying the entire 
market value rule as part of a Georgia-Pacific reasonable royalty 
analysis. In Lucent v. Gateway, the patentee’s damages expert 
claimed that, under the entire market value rule, the parties would 
have agreed to a 1% royalty on the sale of all “infringing computers” 
loaded with the software (Microsoft Outlook) that purportedly 
contained the patented date-picking feature.223 After the trial court 
excluded computer sales as the proper royalty base, the patentee’s 
expert changed his opinion to contend that the royalty base should 
be the price of the allegedly infringing software but that the royalty 
rate should be increased to 8%.224 The jury apparently agreed and 
awarded a $358 million royalty for “a very small component of a 
much larger software program.”225 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
overturned the verdict, holding that it was not supported by 
substantial evidence because there was no evidence that the patented 
feature was “the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the consumer 
demand for” the software program.226 
Similarly, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft, the patentee claimed 
damages relating to nearly $20 billion in sales of Microsoft’s software 
products, including Windows XP and Microsoft Office, which 
 
 222. Brief for Ten Amici Curiae Technology-Based Companies in Support of Appellant 
Microsoft Corp. at 17–18, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (No. 2008-1485), 2008 WL 5550592. 
 223. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 1336–37.  
 226. Id. at 1337 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Lucent did not carry its evidentiary 
burden of proving that anyone purchased Outlook because of the patented method.”). 
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contained the allegedly infringing product activation system.227 The 
patentee’s damages expert opined that a reasonable royalty for the 
patented technology was $564 million, and supported this with a 
reasonableness “check” that his royalty figure was approximately 3% 
of the accused products’ total sales dollar volume.228 Ultimately, the 
jury awarded $388 million as a reasonable royalty.229 During post-
trial motions, the district court granted Microsoft’s request for a new 
trial on damages, finding that the expert’s opinion was an end-run 
around the entire market value rule. It noted that the patentee 
“conceded customers do not buy Office or Windows because of” the 
allegedly infringing product activation feature, and thus could not 
base its proposed royalty—even as a check—on the “market value of 
the products.”230 
D. Balancing the Factors 
Furthermore, Georgia-Pacific’s absence of guidance for balancing 
the various factors contributes to a lack of certainty and predictability 
in reasonable royalty awards. This unpredictability is partially due to 
the test’s lengthy list of fifteen nonexclusive factors. Such broad, 
multifactor tests have been criticized as being poorly designed and 
containing duplicative or overlapping factors, which can lead to 
unpredictable results.231  
Indeed, there is increasing sentiment among intellectual property 
scholars that the Georgia-Pacific test provides juries with inadequate 
 
 227. 640 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156, 184 (D.R.I. 2009). Microsoft’s Product Activation 
(“PA”) system is a feature “contained in software products sold through retail distribution” 
that attempts to prevent software piracy by limiting the number of computers on which 
software can be installed in accordance with the software’s end user license agreement. Id. at 
156–57. Plaintiff Uniloc claimed that Microsoft’s PA system infringed U.S. Patent No. 
5,490,216, which claimed a particular “method of reducing unlicensed use of software 
through casual copying.” Id. at 155. 
 228. Id. at 184–85. 
 229. Id. at 185. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of a 
new trial on damages, explaining that “[t]his case provides a good example of the danger of 
admitting consideration of the entire market value of the accused where the patented 
component does not create the basis for customer demand.” No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738, 
at *24 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 230. Id. at 184–85. 
 231. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2007). 
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instruction on how to determine a reasonable royalty. John R. 
Thomas recently explained that 
[e]xperience suggests that the Georgia-Pacific factors are difficult to 
apply consistently. Although Georgia-Pacific provides a long list of 
ingredients, it offers no recipe—that is to say, no principles for 
deciding whether one of the seemingly randomly ordered elements 
should be weighed more heavily than another in a given 
determination. The laundry list of Georgia Pacific factors . . . 
cannot plausibly be considered to provide a “standard” for setting 
reasonable royalty rates at all.232 
Similarly, John Schlicher has contended that the key problem 
with a reasonable royalty is that “juries are not given useful guidance 
on how to apply the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors.”233 And Mark 
Lemley and Daralyn Durie argue that Georgia-Pacific’s “non-
exclusive fifteen-factor test that requires balancing and consideration 
of the interactions between the factors is likely to give little or no 
practical guidance to a jury.”234 
Similar criticisms were made to the Federal Trade Commission 
during a series of hearings in 2009 entitled The Evolving IP 
Marketplace. Paul Janicke explained that in practice, Georgia-Pacific 
leads to “erratic results” because the test is like a “grab bag” where 
“the judge throws the grab bag with all the factors to the jury and 
says, ‘Do what you think is right.’”235 As a result, he concluded the 
test should be abandoned.236 Likewise, Tom Cotter has observed 
that the Georgia-Pacific factors “can be so easily manipulated by the 
trier of fact to reach virtually any outcome.”237  
 
 232. The Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1260 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Prof. John R. Thomas, Georgetown Univ.), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Thomas090430.pdf. 
 233. John W. Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better Alternatives 
for the Courts and Congress, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 22 (2009). 
 234. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631. 
 235. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Hearing on: The Evolving IP Marketplace, Matter No. 
P093900, at 15 (Feb. 11, 2009) (testimony of Prof. Paul M. Janicke, Univ. of Hous. L. Ctr.), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/090211transcript.pdf. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 39 (testimony of Prof. Thomas F. Cotter, Univ. of Minn. L. Sch.). 
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A little-noted point about Georgia-Pacific is that the test was 
initially created for application by a court, not a jury.238 The district 
court’s opinion in that case noted that a “proper conclusion[] . . . 
concerning the amount of a reasonable royalty” required “the 
exercise of judicial discretion.”239 Like most patent litigation at the 
time, Georgia-Pacific was tried by a court. But today, most patent 
issues—including damages—are decided by juries instead.240 The 
competency of juries to decide complex, lengthy cases has long been 
questioned, particularly for difficult scientific and economic issues.241 
In contrast, judges are generally perceived as being better trained, 
more experienced, and having more time to decide such complex 
issues.242 While an assessment of juror competency in patent 
litigation is outside the scope of this Article,243 it seems likely that a 
lengthy, multifactor test with little instruction on how to balance the 
relevant factors, like Georgia-Pacific, would exacerbate the potential 
juror competency issue.  
In addition, as Mark Lemley and Daralyn Durie have explained, 
the imprecise nature of Georgia-Pacific makes it difficult to exclude 
expert testimony on a reasonable royalty, even if it seems grossly 
disproportionate to the relative value of the patented invention.244 
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals245 and its progeny, 
courts have the duty to act as a “gatekeeper” for proposed expert 
 
 238. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631–32 (explaining that Georgia-Pacific 
was decided at a time when nearly all patent cases were tried before a judge). 
 239. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added). 
 240. Moore, supra note 151, at 366. 
 241. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 150, at 489–95; Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment 
Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decisionmaking, 70 NW. U. L. 
REV. 486 (1975); Note, The Jury’s Capacity to Decide Complex Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(1997). 
 242. Smith, supra note 150, at 489–95. 
 243. For previous scholarly work on this issue, see generally Jennifer F. Miller, Should 
Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2004); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 780–82 
(2002); Davin M. Stockwell, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 645 (2000). 
 244. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632 (“The breadth of the available [Georgia-
Pacific] factors also means that it is difficult to exclude evidence or expert testimony espousing 
virtually any theory of reasonable royalty damages, no matter how outlandish.”). 
 245. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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testimony to determine if it is sufficiently reliable for admission.246 
But because Georgia-Pacific permits the factfinder to consider 
virtually all potentially relevant evidence and give it whatever weight 
it deems appropriate, it is difficult to establish that an expert’s 
reasonable royalty methodology is unreliable, so long as the expert 
professes some semblance of adherence to the Georgia-Pacific 
framework.247 Thus, experts often “run down the list [of fifteen 
Georgia-Pacific factors] and identify some factors that support ‘high’ 
royalty rates, while others identify those factors that support ‘low’ 
royalty rates, whichever seems to benefit them most.”248 As a result, 
the Georgia-Pacific factors easily can be cherry-picked and 
manipulated to justify a large range of potential awards.249  
For example, in Cornell University v. Hewlett Packard Co., 
discussed above,250 the parties’ damages experts offered widely 
diverging opinions regarding an appropriate royalty award. At trial, 
Cornell’s damages expert opined that in a hypothetical negotiation, 
the parties would have agreed to a 2.5% royalty rate on the $23 
billion market for HP’s servers and workstations containing 
computer chips that practiced the patented technology, for a total 
 
 246. See id. at 589 (“[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the district court’s “gatekeeping obligation” under 
Daubert extends “to all expert testimony,” scientific or otherwise). See generally FED. R. EVID. 
702. 
 247. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391–93 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding that plaintiff’s damages expert’s testimony was reliable because he “properly 
applied the accepted Georgia-Pacific methodology to [plaintiff]’s version of the disputed facts, 
explaining the effect each factor would have on a negotiated royalty”); Bowling v. Hasbro, 
Inc., No. 05-229S, 2008 WL 717741, at *3 (D.R.I. Mar. 17, 2008) (“[T]he Georgia-Pacific 
rubric is presumptively reliable in both principle and methodology.”). 
 248. William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate 
Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 51 (2001). 
 249. See Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable Royalty: 
Simplification and Extension of the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 555, 555 (2003) (“The overriding problem is that the [Georgia-Pacific] factors typically 
can be used to justify a very wide range of outcomes.”); see also Hearing on H.R. 1260, supra 
note 232, at *4 (asserting that the result of Georgia-Pacific “has been a potpourri of factors 
that experts may apply with virtually unlimited discretion”). 
 250. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); see also supra notes 169–73 and 
accompanying text. 
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royalty award of $575 million.251 In support of this opinion, 
Cornell’s expert relied on numerous Georgia-Pacific factors, 
including the royalty rates of other licenses entered into by HP 
(Factor 2), the profitability of HP’s servers and workstations (Factor 
8), and the claimed advantages of the patented technology (Factors 
9–11).252 In contrast, HP’s damages expert offered an opinion that 
in a hypothetical negotiation, the parties would have agreed to a 
royalty two orders of magnitude lower: approximately $2 million.253 
HP’s expert’s opinion was based in significant part on a lump-sum 
royalty payment in another patent license HP had entered into for 
microprocessor technology (Factor 2).254 Ultimately, the jury’s 
verdict “split the baby” and awarded Cornell $184 million as a 
reasonable royalty, which it calculated by applying a 0.8% royalty rate 
to the $23 billion royalty base for HP’s servers and workstations.255 
E. Judicial Review 
Last—but not least—the amorphous nature of the Georgia-
Pacific test makes it difficult for a jury’s reasonable royalty award to 
be adequately reviewed during post-trial motions or on appeal.256 
First, juries are almost never required to identify which Georgia-
Pacific factors supported their verdict, nor must they explain what 
weight was given to any particular factor. Rather, juries are usually 
instructed to either (1) identify the applicable royalty rate and total 
royalty award257 or (2) simply state the “sum of money” that “would 
 
 251. Trial Tr. vol. IV, at 65, May 23, 2008, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 
01-CV-01974 (N.D.N.Y.) (testimony of Dr. Marion J. Stewart). 
 252. Id. at 53–59. Cornell’s expert also claimed that he considered Cornell’s willingness 
to license the patent (Factor 4), the remaining duration of patent protection (Factor 7), and 
contributions made by HP to the servers and workstations that were not related to the 
patented technology (Factor 13). Id. at 55–58. 
 253. Trial Tr. vol. VIII, at 154–55, May 28, 2008, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., No. 01-CV-01974 (N.D.N.Y.) (testimony of John Ostendorf). 
 254. Id. at 150–55. 
 255. Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282. As previously discussed, after trial, Judge 
Rader granted Hewlett-Packard’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Cornell’s claim 
that it was entitled to a royalty on the entire $23 billion market for HP servers and 
workstations, and reduced Cornell’s royalty award to approximately $53 million. Id. at 287–
93; see also supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632. 
 257. See, e.g., Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., No. 02-CV-1087-VAP, 
2008 WL 6873809, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2008); Special Verdict Form at 9, Kowalski v. 
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fairly and reasonably compensate” the patentee for the 
infringement.258 
Second, jury instructions that recite the potpourri of Georgia-
Pacific factors tend to make effective post-trial review of reasonable 
royalty awards more difficult. During final jury instructions, the 
district court typically explains the concept of a reasonable royalty259 
and then lists all of the Georgia-Pacific factors, leaving it up to the 
jury to evaluate and weigh the evidence and the factors.260 For 
example, the official commentary to the Seventh Circuit’s model 
instructions emphasizes that the district court “should be sensitive 
not to highlight one or more of the [Georgia-Pacific] factors in the 
instructions, to avoid any implication that the Court has endorsed 
certain of the evidence.”261 Finally, some jury instructions include a 
 
Momma Gina Tuna Res., Nos. 05-00679-BMK et al. (D. Haw. Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with 
author); Special Verdict Form at 8–9, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Nos. 02-CV-2060 
B (CAB) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007), available at 2007 WL 892887; see also NAT’L JURY 
INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Verdict Form A (requesting 
the jury identify the royalty rate and total dollar amount of royalty damages), available at 
http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf. 
 258. See, e.g., Verdict Form at 2, i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07-CV-113 
(E.D. Tex. May 20, 2009) (on file with author); Verdict Form at 31, Creative Internet Adver. 
Corp. v Yahoo! Inc., No. 6:07-CV-354 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (on file with author); see 
also Stephen S. Korniczky & Don W. Martens, Verdict Forms – A Peek Into the “Black Box,” 23 
AIPLA Q.J. 617, 621 (1995) (explaining that “most federal, jury-tried, civil cases are resolved 
by a general verdict,” which “commonly appears as a single statement in a form similar to the 
following: ‘We, the jury in the above-entitled action find for the plaintiff and against the 
defendant in the amount of $______ dollars’”). 
 259. See NAT’L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 257, § 6.6 (2009); AM. 
INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS  
§ 12.15 (2008), available at http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/ 
Publications_available_for_viewing1/2008_03_27_AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.pdf; 
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 11.4.4 (2009), available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf. 
 260. See AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, § 12.16 (“In 
determining the value of a reasonable royalty, you may consider evidence on any of the 
following [Georgia-Pacific] factors . . . .”); Charge of the Court at 25–27, Creative Internet 
Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 6:07-CV-354 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (same). The 
Northern District of California’s model patent instruction is a notable exception, as it does not 
list any of the Georgia-Pacific factors. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA § 5.7 (2007), available at 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov. 
 261. FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 259, § 
11.4.4 cmt. 2. 
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“sixteenth factor” that instruct the jury to consider “any other 
economic factor that a normally prudent business person would . . . 
take into consideration” during the hypothetical negotiation.262 
Based on these broad instructions, it is very difficult for the district 
court to determine the factual basis for the jury’s royalty award after 
a verdict has been entered. As a result, the court “may be inclined to 
simply give up and defer to whatever the jury awards.”263  
For example, in the Lucent v. Gateway MP3 litigation, the 
district court partially denied Microsoft’s motion for a new trial on 
damages after the parties had introduced a plethora of evidence and 
damages models under Georgia-Pacific. It held that “absent a view 
into the ‘black-box’ of the jury’s decision making process, the Court 
cannot say that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent or without the 
support of sufficient evidence.”264 Likewise, in Revolution Eyeware, 
Inc. v. Aspex Eyeware, Inc., the district court rejected the infringer’s 
claim that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by substantial evidence 
because the jury could have considered a wide variety of evidence 
relevant to the Georgia-Pacific factors.265 It concluded that 
“[a]lthough the precise method by which the jury decided the 
amount of damages [the patentee] suffered remains unknown . . . 
there is sufficient evidence to support the damages awarded.”266 
Third, the Federal Circuit’s highly deferential standard of review 
toward a jury’s reasonable royalty award means that relatively few 
awards are overturned on appeal. The determination of damages 
based on a reasonable royalty is a question of fact,267 and the Federal 
Circuit has admitted that jury’s reasonable royalty award necessarily 
involves some approximation and uncertainty.268 On appeal, a jury’s 
damages award “‘must be upheld unless the amount is grossly 
 
 262. AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, § 12.16; NAT’L 
JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 257, § 6.6. 
 263. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632. 
 264. Lucent Techs, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912, 940 (S.D. Cal. 2007).  
 265. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., No. 02-CV-01087-VAP, 2008 
WL 6873809, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 266. Id. 
 267. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 
1991); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In 
reviewing damages awards in patent cases, we give broad deference to the conclusions reached 
by the finder of fact.”). 
 268. Monsanto, 488 F.3d at 981. 
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excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or 
based only on speculation or guesswork.’”269 Under this permissive 
standard, then, it is unsurprising that only a small fraction of 
reasonable royalty awards determined under Georgia-Pacific have 
been overturned on appeal.270 
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has shown more interest 
in scrutinizing the factual support for reasonable royalty awards, 
which may result in less deference to juries’ damage determinations. 
For example, in September 2009, the Federal Circuit vacated a $511 
million award in the Lucent v. Gateway litigation involving Microsoft 
Outlook and remanded for a new trial on damages, concluding that 
“the jury’s damages award is not supported by substantial evidence, 
but is based mainly on speculation or guesswork.”271 In particular, 
the court found that many of the previous patent licenses Lucent 
relied upon for its proffered royalty calculation were “radically 
different from the hypothetical agreement under consideration for 
the [patents-in-suit],”272 and that the infringing feature was only “a 
tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program.”273 
Similarly, in Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions, 
Inc.,274 decided in June 2010, the Federal Circuit held that previous 
licenses to the patents-in-suit could not support the jury’s award of 
$250,000—which equated to a 26.3% effective royalty rate—to the 
plaintiff because some licenses contained insufficient information on 
how they were calculated, and the remaining ones had much lower 
 
 269. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1992)); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Asking whether a damages award is ‘reasonable,’ ‘grossly excessive or monstrous,’ ‘based 
only on speculation or guesswork,’ or ‘clearly not supported by the evidence,’ are simply 
different ways of asking whether the jury’s award is supported by the evidence.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 270. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (“Most jury [patent] damages awards reviewed on 
appeal have been held to be supported by substantial evidence.”); Durie & Lemley, supra note 
1, at 633–34 (finding a 72% to 77% affirmance rate by the Federal Circuit for reasonable 
royalty damage awards). 
 271. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1332, 1335. 
 272. Id. at 1327. Indeed, Lucent conceded on appeal that “‘none of the real world 
licenses introduced at trial arose from circumstances identical to those presumed to prevail in 
the hypothetical royalty negotiation.’” Id. at 1329 (citation omitted). 
 273. Id. at 1332. 
 274. 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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running royalty rates of 3–6%.275 This increased scrutiny of jury 
awards is a welcome trend, but it is unlikely to solve the inherent 
malleability of the Georgia-Pacific standard by itself. 
V. THE COST OF AN ACCEPTABLE NONINFRINGING SUBSTITUTE 
SHOULD SERVE AS A CEILING ON A REASONABLE ROYALTY AWARD 
In lieu of Georgia-Pacific, this Article proposes that courts 
should adopt an alternative standard for imposing a reasonable 
royalty: when an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patented 
technology exists, the cost of that substitute should serve as a 
“ceiling” on a reasonable royalty. 
A. The Role of Acceptable Noninfringing Substitutes in the 
Hypothetical Negotiation 
As the Supreme Court explained in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (“Aro II”),276 the proper measure 
of “damages” under § 284 is “the difference between [the 
patentee’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his 
condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.”277 
This “but for” inquiry “requires a reconstruction of the market, as it 
would have developed absent the infringing product, to determine 
what the patentee would have made.”278  
A key consideration in this ex ante market reconstruction is what 
“alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken 
had he not infringed.”279 As previously explained, in the hypothetical 
negotiation framework, the hypothetical licensee would have three 
options—to infringe, to take a license to the patent, or to forego use 
of the patented technology.280 The hypothetical negotiation assumes 
 
 275. Id. at 1319–21; see also ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (vacating and remanding a district court’s reasonable royalty award because it relied 
on “speculative and unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm linked to the 
claimed invention”).  
 276. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).  
 277. Id. at 507 (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 278. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (internal quotations, citation, and ellipses omitted). 
 279. Id. at 1350–51. 
 280. See supra Part III.B. 
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the second option—that the licensee would agree to a license. 
However, the third option looms large in determining the outer 
bounds of what the hypothetical licensee would have agreed to pay 
for such a license.  
In a hypothetical negotiation, a rational prospective licensee 
would consider the “Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement” 
(BATNA)—that is, the best result that can be obtained if the 
negotiation fails to reach an agreement.281 A licensee’s BATNA 
represents its “walk-away value”: the maximum it would be willing 
to pay for a license to the patented technology.282 Thus, a 
hypothetical negotiation necessarily “occurs in the shadow of the 
alternative.”283 In many cases, in lieu of paying for a license, the best 
alternative may be adoption of a substitute noninfringing 
technology. 
For example, in Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-
Products Co., the Federal Circuit explained that “an accurate 
reconstruction of the hypothetical ‘but for’ market” should “take[] 
into account any [noninfringing] alternatives” to the patented 
technology that would be “available to the infringer.”284 In that case, 
the patentee, Grain Processing, owned a patent that claimed a type 
of maltodextrins—a family of food additives made from starch—and 
processes for producing them.285 The defendant, American Maize-
Products, was accused of infringing Grain Processing’s patented 
process for over a decade using three different manufacturing 
processes.286 After being informed that its third process allegedly 
infringed the patent, American Maize-Products implemented a new 
process, called Process IV, within two weeks (a period called 
 
 281. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 95, at 99–100. 
 282. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory 
Commercial Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 233. 
 283. Id.; see also Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License: Facilitating License 
Negotiation for Efficient Post-Verdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427, 
440 (2008) (“The value that a patentee can demand in licensing negotiations is limited by the 
cost of the infringer’s Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA.”). 
 284. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1351. 
 285. Id. at 1343–44. Although not a commonly known ingredient, the market for 
maltodextrins is quite large—the Federal Circuit noted that commercial food manufacturers 
use hundreds of millions of pounds of maltodextrins annually in a wide variety of food 
products, including drinks, syrups, frostings, cereals, and frozen foods. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1345–47.  
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“practically instantaneous” for large-scale production by the district 
court).287  
In litigation, Grain Processing asked for lost profits or, 
alternatively, a reasonable royalty. The district court rejected the lost 
profits claims, finding that the alternative noninfringing process 
implemented by American Maize-Products meant Grain Processing 
could not recover lost profits under the Panduit test.288 Grain 
Products appealed this determination, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, holding that Process IV was an acceptable, noninfringing 
substitute during the entire damages period.289 The Federal Circuit 
explained that a comparison of the “patented invention to its next-
best available alternative(s)—regardless of whether the alternative(s) 
were actually produced and sold during the infringement”—would 
permit the factfinder to discern “the market value of the patent 
owner’s exclusive right.”290 Thus, “[t]he availability of substitutes 
invariably will influence the market forces defining this ‘but for’ 
marketplace.”291 
Although lost profits were at issue in the Grain Processing 
decision, its logic is equally applicable in the reasonable royalty 
context.292 As the district court decision in Georgia-Pacific explained, 
a hypothetical negotiation for a reasonable royalty must account for 
“the realities of the bargaining table.”293 Confronted with an 
“unreasonably high license fee for patented technology,” a rational 
 
 287. Id. at 1346. 
 288. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1386, 1390–93 
(N.D. Ind. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The 
district court also rejected Grain Processing’s proposed royalty of 28% of American Maize-
Products’ revenue from sales of the infringing product, awarding a 3% royalty due to its costs 
savings from the patented technology. Id. at 1392–93. 
 289. 185 F.3d at 1352–55. 
 290. Id. at 1351. 
 291. Id. at 1356. 
 292. See, e.g., Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 
354, 384 (1987) (“[T]he existence or non-existence of a non-infringing alternative is as 
important a factor in determining the amount of a reasonable royalty as it is in determining 
whether lost profits will be awarded.”). 
 293. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
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licensee would “ordinarily opt for [a] noninfringing alternative[].”294 
Thus, when both parties are aware—as required by the rules of the 
hypothetical negotiation—that the prospective licensee can “walk 
away” from the bargaining table and adopt a substitute at a lower 
cost than the royalty demanded by the patentee, this threat can be a 
powerful one. In such a hypothetical negotiation, “the defendant 
will have a good argument as to why it would not pay much to 
license a patent . . . the defendant could simply ‘go across the street’ 
and use that technology, rather than [the] plaintiff’s.”295  
Several Federal Circuit decisions suggest that it might extend 
Grain Processing to reasonable royalties, although it has not expressly 
done so.296 For example, in Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,297 the Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded a lost profits award in light of the 
defendant’s claim that an acceptable noninfringing alternative 
existed.298 The court also vacated and remanded for determination of 
a reasonable royalty on similar grounds, explaining that in a 
hypothetical negotiation, the accused infringer “would have been in 
a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it 
had a competitive noninfringing device ‘in the wings.’”299 Likewise, 
in Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,300 the Federal Circuit 
vacated a reasonable royalty award for damages associated with an 
infringing method of anchoring an offshore drilling platform without 
using mud mats. It held that the patentee’s damages expert’s model 
was flawed because it attempted to claim a royalty on the entire 
offshore platform, rather than the incremental benefit of anchoring 
offshore oil rigs without mud mats.301 It explained that “in the 
hypothetical negotiation that characterizes the reasonable royalty 
calculation, [the accused infringer] may have had non-infringing 
 
 294. Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., 1997 WL 16032, at *7 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (en banc)). 
 295. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 104. 
 296. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 297. 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 298. Id. at 1571–72. 
 299. Id. 
 300. 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 301. Id. at 1312. 
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alternatives to installing with temporary pilings.”302 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit held, “under the constraints of the hypothetical negotiation, 
the market could not award [the patentee] a royalty for his method 
divorced of all relation to a potential noninfringing alternative 
method. The economic relationship between the patented method 
and noninfringing alternative methods, of necessity, would limit the 
hypothetical negotiation.”303  
B. What is an “Acceptable” Substitute? 
One key issue under this Article’s proposed standard is whether a 
potential substitute constitutes an “acceptable” replacement for the 
patented technology. If there is no acceptable noninfringing 
substitute for the patented technology, at least for some customers, 
then the hypothetical licensee cannot negotiate a lower royalty rate 
by threatening to forego a license and switch to another technology.  
The Federal Circuit’s decisions on acceptable noninfringing 
alternatives in the lost profits context provide some guidance on this 
question. As previously explained, to recover lost profits under the 
Panduit test, the patentee must establish “an absence of acceptable 
noninfringing substitutes.”304 For this requirement, the Federal 
Circuit has held that “[c]onsumer demand defines the relevant 
market and relative substitutability among products therein.”305 
Important facts relevant to this determination include the “similarity 
of physical and functional attributes of the patentee’s product” to 
the alleged substitute, “consumers’ intended use for the patentee’s 
product,” and the price of the alleged substitute compared to the 
patented technology.306 These requirements “ensure[] that any 
proffered alternative competes in the same market for the same 
customers as the infringer’s product.”307 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. (citing Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 304. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). 
 305. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1355. 
 306. Id. (citing Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 307. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l., Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
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Some Federal Circuit decisions go even further, however, and 
attempt to draw a bright line between acceptable and non-acceptable 
substitutes. Under these decisions, to be “acceptable,” “the alleged 
alternative ‘must not have a disparately higher price than or possess 
characteristics significantly different from the patented’” 
technology.308 A common refrain is that “[a] product lacking the 
advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute 
‘acceptable’ to the customer who wants those advantages.”309  
The latter definition of an “acceptable” substitute is likely too 
narrow to be useful, because unpatented substitutes often do not 
have the exact attributes or qualities as validly patented inventions.310 
Rather, “[i]n real markets for actual products, substitution is a 
matter of degree” because “[s]ome, but not all, customers will 
substitute a product without the patented technology for one with 
the technology.”311 Moreover, the bright-line approach is 
inconsistent with economic theory, which explains that even 
imperfect substitutes can constrain the exercise of market power by a 
patentee. As Judge Easterbrook has explained, “[c]ompetition is not 
an all-or-none process. There are degrees of substitutability.”312 
Thus, the value of “[p]atented items in an imperfect, but still 
competitive, market will be restrained . . . depending on the degree 
to which substitutes are functionally equivalent.”313 When there are 
“close substitutes for the patented product, competition from these 
substitutes would restrain the patent holder’s potential . . . royalty he 
 
 308. Id. (quoting Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). 
 309. TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1162 (6th Cir. 
1978)); see also Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (holding that a “‘product on the market which lacks the advantages of the patented 
product can hardly be termed a[n] [acceptable] substitute’” (quoting Standard Havens, 953 
F.2d at 1373)). 
 310. Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 
701 (1993).  
 311. Vincent E. O’Brien, Economics and Key Patent Damages Cases, 9 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 6 (2000). 
 312. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1389–90 (N.D. Ill. 
1993), aff’d, 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 313. Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine 
Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 186 n.13 (2009). 
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could charge.”314 Thus, competition from imperfect substitutes is 
weak enough to “allow the patent holder to raise price above cost or 
charge some royalty, but strong enough so the patent holder’s 
optimal price or royalty is less than the monopoly price or 
royalty.”315 The price and capabilities of the imperfect substitute play 
an important role in determining the premium that a patent holder 
can charge for its own product.316 In sum, a “bright-line” test for 
substitutability ignores the reality that often “product substitution is 
a matter of degree and occurs across a spectrum.”317 
For an example of imperfect substitutes, consider the various 
versions of the iPhone. The first iPhone, released in mid-2007, 
supported Internet access over either a local Wi-Fi network or a wide 
area cellular network using GSM or EDGE, both second-generation 
(2G) wireless data technologies.318 The iPhone 3G, introduced in 
2008, included support for third-generation (3G) wireless data,319 
with a download speed up to ten times faster than 2G.320 Its 
successor, the iPhone 3GS, includes (among other things) an 
enhanced version of the 3G standard321 and a processor that is 
purportedly up to two times faster than the one in the iPhone 3G.322 
And finally, the most recent model, the iPhone 4, included an 
 
 314. John D. Culbertson & Roy Weinstein, Product Substitutes and the Calculation of 
Patent Damages, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 749, 750 (1988). 
 315. Id. at 749–50. 
 316. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 214 (2005) (“Whether one 
product substitutes for another depends not only upon the function of the two products, but 
also upon the prices at which they are offered to the public.”). 
 317. O’Brien, supra note 311, at 7. 
 318. Wikipedia, iPhone, (Jan. 8, 2011 4:47 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPhone. 
 319. Id. 
 320. See Macworld, The iPhone 3G: What You Need To Know, June 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.macworld.com/article/133988/2008/07/iphone3gfaqs.html (last modified 
July 9, 2008, 1:13 PM) (stating that iPhone 3G has “typical download speeds as high as 
1.4Mbps versus average data speeds between 75Kbps and 135Kpbs on its EDGE network”). 
 321. Wikipedia, List of iPhone and iPod Touch Models, (Jan. 7, 2011, 10:30 AM) 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iPhone_and_iPod_Touch_models (iPhone 3GS 
supported 7.2 Mbps HSDPA standard). 
 322. Apple, Inc., iPhone – View All the Features of the new iPhone 3GS, 
http://www.apple.com/iphone/iphone-3gs (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
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improved display and a high-definition (HD) video camera for video 
calling, among other features.323 
In reality, some customers would consider the older version(s) of 
the iPhone to be an “acceptable” substitute to the new iPhone 4, 
particularly when an older model is offered at half the cost (or 
less).324 Under the Federal Circuit’s rigid definition of substitutes, 
however, the earlier iPhone models could not be considered 
“acceptable” because they did not offer all the same advantages as 
the iPhone 4—even though the older models are capable of 
performing many of the same functions, such as retrieving and 
reading email, surfing the Internet, playing music and video, and 
using apps, just at a lower speed. Thus, for a reasonable royalty, 
imperfect substitutes should be evaluated as potentially “acceptable” 
alternatives as well. 
C. The Costs of Adopting an Acceptable Noninfringing Substitute 
The cost to acquire an acceptable noninfringing substitute, along 
with any relevant “changeover” costs such as implementation costs 
and lost profits due to delay, represents the maximum royalty a 
rational licensee would agree to pay for the patented technology.325  
As discussed above, the hypothetical negotiation must consider 
alternatives to infringement, including the licensee’s potential 
adoption of a noninfringing substitute. A rational licensee would not 
agree to pay more to use an infringing technology than the costs 
(including lost profits) it would expect to incur by using the next 
 
 323. Apple, Inc., iPhone 4 – Video Calls, Multitasking, HD Video, and More, 
http://www.apple.com/iphone (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). Some features of the iPhone 4, 
such as multitasking, are available on older versions of the iPhone through an update to 
iPhone’s operating system. Id.  
 324. See Apple, Inc., iPhone – Compare iPhone 4S and iPhone 3GS, 
http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare-iphones (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) ($99 list price for 
iPhone 3GS (8 GB storage) with two-year service agreement, compared to $199 (16 GB 
storage) or $299 (32 GB storage) for iPhone 4); see also BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 316, at 
214 (explaining that “an infringer who could have used an alternative that some consumers 
would have viewed as an adequate substitute for the patented invention would have siphoned 
off some sales from the patent owner”). 
 325. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 69, at 59 (explaining that in a real negotiation, “the 
infringer would have agreed to a royalty equal to no more than the amount he could have 
expected to earn from using a non-infringing alternative”). 
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best noninfringing alternative. As explained by John Schlicher, a 
reasonable royalty  
requires consideration of the extent to which the potential licensee 
had available to it an alternative noninfringing product that it could 
make and sell without a license, and the profits the licensee could 
make using that alternative. No prudent potential licensee would 
pay for a license an amount greater than the difference between the 
profits it could earn employing the licensed invention and the 
profits it could earn employing the next best noninfringing 
alternative to it, and a prudent licensor will recognize this aspect of 
the relative bargaining positions of the parties.326 
For a substitute that confers the same benefits as the patented 
technology, this cost is expressed mathematically below, where LP 
represents the licensing fee for the patented technology, CA 
represents the costs to acquire or obtain the noninfringing 
substitute, and CS represents the “switching” costs related to 
adopting the noninfringing substitute:  
 
LP ≤ CA + CS 
 
CA varies depending on the nature of the noninfringing 
substitute. For technology that is already available in the public 
domain—for example, because patent protection was never obtained 
or has expired, or the technology is not patentable because it is an 
obvious improvement over the prior art327—the acquisition cost 
usually will be minimal.328 Some substitutes, however, may be 
patented or otherwise protected (for instance, copyrighted software) 
by a third party and thus might require a substantial licensing fee to 
the rights-holder.329  
 
 326. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 1:96 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 327. For a discussion of the various uses of the public domain in intellectual property law, 
see Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s 
Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 
100–19 (2003). 
 328. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (“[An] 
unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain 
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”). 
 329. See, e.g., Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907–08 (D. 
Minn. 2009) (defendant asserted that a reasonable royalty should be capped at $1.688 million, 
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A third possibility is a substitute developed, or easily able to be 
developed, by the alleged infringer. In this situation, the acquisition 
costs would be the accused infringer’s cost to develop the 
substitute.330 For example, in Grain Processing, American Maize 
developed a noninfringing substitute (Process IV) to the patented 
process in a relatively short time period (two weeks).331 Similarly, in 
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., before introducing the accused 
interferometer, the defendant, Wyko, had sold an allegedly 
acceptable noninfringing alternative.332 Wyko argued that in the “but 
for” market, it would have continued to sell the noninfringing 
alternative.333 
CS represents the “switching” costs associated with the accused 
infringer’s switch to a noninfringing substitute shortly before the 
time of first infringement. For example, “the defendant might have 
substantial ‘retooling’ costs” associated with implementing the 
noninfringing substitute.334 In addition, it might lose expected 
profits for the time that it switches to a new product. For instance, if 
the defendant in Grain Processing had required $2 million in 
expenditures and a two-month delay to implement its new, 
noninfringing substitute manufacturing process, the “switching” 
costs would include both the $2 million and the lost profits from 
sales of maltodextrin during the delay.  
In addition, a third variable may be involved if the noninfringing 
substitute does not confer all of the same benefits as the patented 
technology. For instance, if a noninfringing substitute required a 
 
which represented the cost of a modified machine offered by a third party as a noninfringing 
alternative); see also Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1222–23 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (holding that a licensed product is an acceptable noninfringing alternative to patented 
technology). 
 330. See Culbertson & Weinstein, supra note 314, at 756 (“In determining the 
appropriate royalty rate, it is also necessary to consider the cost of designing around the patent, 
since no competitor is likely to negotiate a royalty rate that produces payments substantially 
greater than the design-around cost.”). 
 331. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1346–47 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 332. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
 333. Id. 
 334. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 105; see also Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, 
at 832 (“An important consideration is whether there exist any noninfringing ‘design-arounds’ 
and the costs of implementing and using those design-arounds as compared to using the 
patented technology.”). 
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2.3% greater marginal cost of production compared to the patented 
technology,335 this represents an additional cost to the hypothetical 
licensee that it would be willing to hypothetically pay for the 
patented technology. Thus, accounting for the incremental benefit 
of the patented invention compared to the noninfringing 
substitute—which is represented by BP—would be expressed as 
follows: 
 
LP ≤ CA + CS + BP 
 
Thus, a reasonable royalty award should be effectively “capped” 
by the sum of the cost to acquire an acceptable noninfringing 
substitute (CA); the costs associated with implementing the 
substitute (CS); and the marginal benefit, if any, conferred by the 
patented technology over the substitute (BP). 
As an illustration, assume that in a hypothetical negotiation, the 
patentee (P) demanded a lump-sum royalty of $25 million for 
indefinite use of the patented technology. Shortly before first 
infringement, however, the accused infringer (AI) could internally 
develop an acceptable substitute for a cost of $3 million (CA) in one 
month. This one-month delay, however, would push back the 
introduction of AI’s new product, resulting in projected lost profits 
of $6 million. In addition, AI would incur a cost of an additional $1 
million to implement the substitute technology in its new products, 
resulting in CS = $7 million. If the substitute technology offered the 
same benefits as the patent technology (and thus BP = 0), the rational 
licensee would offer only $10 million (CA + CS) as a royalty in the 
hypothetical negotiation. Knowing that AI had an equally-good 
substitute that it could adopt for $10 million, P would have no 
choice but to accept this amount as a royalty. 
If it is further assumed that the noninfringing alternative is an 
imperfect substitute for the patented technology, however, this also 
must be taken into account. For example, assume that because it is 
incorporating an imperfect substitute, AI must charge a slightly 
lower price for its new product, resulting in projected lost profits of 
 
 335. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp., 893 F. Supp. at 1354 (affirming the district court’s 
finding that the patented technology conferred approximately a 2.3% reduction in costs 
compared to the noninfringing Process IV). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 12:58 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1722 
an additional $10 million over the product’s lifespan (BP). As a 
result, AI would be willing to pay P a total of $20 million (CA + CS + 
BP) as a lump sum license. 
Recently, in Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.,336 the Federal 
Circuit suggested that reasonable royalty damages should not be 
capped at the cost of a noninfringing alternative. This decision, 
however, is unconvincing. In Mars, the plaintiff brought an action 
against defendant Coin Acceptors (“Coinco”) for infringement of 
two patents covering vending machine coin changers.337 On the 
reasonable royalty issue, the district court imposed a 7% blended 
royalty rate for both patents during the damages period.338 Coinco 
challenged this royalty on several grounds, including “that the 
district court erred by awarding a reasonable royalty rate higher than 
the cost to Coinco of implementing acceptable noninfringing 
alternatives.”339 The Federal Circuit held that “no available and 
acceptable noninfringing alternative” to the patents existed at the 
time of the hypothetical negotiation.340  
In a brief paragraph of dicta following this holding, the court 
also stated that “even if Coinco had shown that it had an acceptable 
noninfringing alternative at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, 
Coinco is wrong as a matter of law to claim that reasonable royalty 
damages are capped at the cost of implementing the cheapest 
available, acceptable, noninfringing alternative.”341 Citing Monsanto 
Co. v. Ralph,342 the court summarily stated that it had “previously 
considered and rejected such an argument.”343 However, the 
Monsanto decision did not involve consideration of noninfringing 
alternatives. Instead, in Monsanto, the court merely refused to 
overturn the jury’s award based on the Georgia-Pacific factors, 
finding that it was not “grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not 
supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation or 
 
 336. 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 337. Id. at 1362–63.  
 338. Id. at 1372. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 1373.  
 341. Id.  
 342. 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 343. Mars, Inc., 527 F.3d at 1373. 
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guesswork.”344 Moreover, the Mars decision did not refer to the 
Federal Circuit’s previous ruling in Grain Processing, the leading 
authority on noninfringing alternatives, nor did it mention Riles, 
which strongly suggested that noninfringing alternatives also played 
a critical role in the reasonable royalty context. 
Subsequent courts should decline to follow the Mars decision’s 
dicta on noninfringing substitutes. It is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Aro II—which has been repeatedly 
relied upon by the Federal Circuit—that “the statutory measure of 
‘damages’ is ‘the difference between [the patent owner’s] pecuniary 
condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have 
been if the infringement had not occurred.’”345 As explained in 
Grain Processing, this requires an analysis based on “sound economic 
proof” and “likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the 
economic picture,” including the adoption of “any alternatives 
available to the infringer.”346 As explained above, no rational 
hypothetical licensee would agree to pay more than the expected 
cost of an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patent—
especially in the face of an unreasonably high licensing demand. The 
Federal Circuit’s dicta in Mars thus flies in the face of sound 
economic analysis and could result in overcompensation of 
patentees. 
D. A Ceiling Based on Acceptable Noninfringing Substitutes Will Not 
Undercompensate Patentees by Granting a “Free Option” to Infringe 
One potential criticism of this Article’s proposed approach to 
calculating reasonable royalty damages is that it may result in the 
undercompensation of patentees. Specifically, proponents of the 
status quo may argue that it gives a “free option” to the infringer, 
where the infringer has the choice to use the patented technology 
and risk litigation. If found to infringe, the infringer can then argue 
“that it would have switched to the noninfringing technology in the 
 
 344. 382 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 
F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  
 345. See, e.g., Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)). 
 346. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).  
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but-for world, thereby effectively making the switch retroactively.”347 
The infringer would then pay no more than the cost than it would 
have incurred if it had decided to originally implement the 
substitute.348 In this situation, “[t]he infringer would have nothing 
to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the 
normal, routine royalty noninfringers might have paid. As said by 
this court in another context, the infringer would be in a ‘heads-I-
win, tails-you-lose’ position.”349 According to this argument, this 
“free option” for infringement “reduces the deterrent effect of 
litigation and thereby encourages infringement.”350 
In reality, however, undercompensation of patentees due to a 
“free option” for infringement is unlikely for several reasons. First, 
when an infringer knows about a patent and then deliberately 
decides to infringe it, there is a significant possibility that the 
infringer will be held liable for willful infringement, resulting in 
enhanced damages.351 Section 284 grants the district court discretion 
to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed” by the jury or court.352 “A finding of willful infringement is 
a prerequisite to the award of enhanced damages.”353 Under In re 
Seagate,354 to recover enhanced damages, the patentee must establish 
that (1) the accused infringer was aware of the patent, (2) the 
accused infringer acted despite an “objectively high likelihood” that 
its actions infringed a valid patent, and (3) this “objectively high 
likelihood” was either known or should have been obvious to the 
accused infringer.355 In the preceding scenario, requirement (1) is 
easily met because the infringer had actual knowledge of the patent. 
Requirements (2) and (3) also may be satisfied because the patentee 
had actual knowledge that it was practicing the patent’s claims, 
 
 347. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 830 (emphasis omitted). 
 348. Id. at 830–31. 
 349. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
 350. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 831. 
 351. See Love, supra note 89, at 926 (explaining that “an infringer making the deliberate 
decision to misappropriate patented technology and force litigation rather than paying for an 
ex ante license [] would almost certainly qualify as a willful infringer”). 
 352. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 353. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 354. In re Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 355. Id. at 1370–72.  
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although the infringer could still argue that there was not an 
“objectively high likelihood” because, for example, it had an opinion 
from counsel that the patent was invalid.356 The threat of triple 
damages is thus a significant deterrent to an infringer’s decision to 
exercise a “free option” to infringe.  
Second, in addition to a willfulness finding, the accused infringer 
may also be held liable for attorney’s fees. Under § 285, “[t]he court 
in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”357 A case may be considered “exceptional” when 
the infringer’s conduct was willful.358 This authorization for 
attorneys’ fees is intended to serve as a “deterrent[] to blatant, blind, 
willful infringement of valid patents,”359 such as the “free option” 
described above. This deterrent can be quite substantial as well—a 
recent study found that when the amount at risk was between $1 
million and $25 million, the average cost of patent litigation was 
approximately $3.1 million.360 When the amount at risk exceeded 
$25 million, the average cost of litigation jumped to $6.25 
million.361 
Third, if the patentee offers (or has attempted to introduce) a 
competing product for sale against the infringer’s product, then it 
may obtain an alternative measure of relief, rather than relying on a 
reasonable royalty award. As previously explained, lost profits are 
available if the patentee can demonstrate that it would have lost sales 
but for the defendant’s infringement under the Panduit test.362 
Furthermore, a patentee may be able to obtain injunctive relief under 
§ 283.363 Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,364 a patentee who 
 
 356. See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (holding that “a ‘competent opinion of counsel’ concluding either that [the accused 
infringer] did not infringe the [] patent or that [the patent] was invalid would provide a 
sufficient basis for [the accused infringer] to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless 
behavior”). 
 357. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 358. E.g., Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 359. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 360. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 at I-129 
(2009).  
 361. Id. 
 362. See supra Part III.A. 
 363. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
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prevails in an infringement suit is no longer automatically entitled to 
a permanent injunction. Rather, a permanent injunction is within the 
discretion of the district court and depends on a number of equitable 
factors, including whether the patentee has suffered an irreparable 
injury, whether other remedies are inadequate to compensate for the 
infringement, whether the balance of hardships in granting the 
injunction favors the patentee, and whether the public interest would 
be disserved by an injunction.365 But even after eBay, studies have 
shown that permanent injunctions have been granted in a majority of 
cases when they have been requested by a patentee in a successful 
infringement suit.366 In fact, “[t]here is a strong, almost perfect, 
correlation between competition between the parties and injunctive 
relief.”367 Thus, lost profits and injunctive relief are also significant 
deterrents to a “free option” to infringe in many cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After almost forty years, the Georgia-Pacific test for determining 
reasonable royalty damages has outlived its usefulness. The 
assortment of nonexclusive factors in the test have proven difficult 
for juries to apply, particularly in the context of sophisticated 
products like computers, smartphones, and other items that embody 
a variety of technology. In addition, Georgia-Pacific prevents judges 
from effectively performing their “gatekeeping” role under Daubert 
to screen out unreliable—and even unreasonable—proposed expert 
testimony regarding a reasonable royalty, as well as adequately 
reviewing jury awards to determine if they are truly supported by the 
evidence. Ultimately, a standard that grants the jury almost limitless 
discretion to award damages, as Georgia-Pacific does, is really no 
meaningful standard at all. 
 
 364. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 365. Id. at 391–92. 
 366. See Benjamin Peterson, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 193, 196–97 (2008) (finding that permanent injunctions were granted in 24 of 33 
cases in the two years after eBay); Docket Navigator, Success Rates for Permanent Injunctions 
after eBay v. MercExchange (Nov. 20, 2009, 3:33 PM), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/ 
2009/11/success-rates-for-permanent-injunction.html (finding that from Jan. 2008 to Nov. 
2009, district courts granted permanent injunctions in 58 out of 93 requests). 
 367. Peterson, supra note 365, at 194. 
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When there is an acceptable noninfringing substitute to the 
patented technology, a more economically appropriate royalty would 
be based on the costs of the substitute. Specifically, the cost to the 
infringer of adopting and implementing an acceptable noninfringing 
substitute, plus any incremental benefit provided by the patented 
technology vis-à-vis the substitute, represents the true economic 
value of the patent over the prior art. As a result, the cost of the 
noninfringing substitute represents the maximum amount a rational 
licensee would have agreed to pay in a hypothetical negotiation.  
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